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* 
& Tara Isa Koslov
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Abstract: Effective competition policy is critical to the success of U.S. health care 
reform, including efforts to reduce health care costs, increase quality of care, and expand 
access to health care services. While promoting competition is necessary at every level of the 
rapidly evolving health care system, it is particularly important with respect to licensed 
professionals who provide health care services. This Article argues that the current system of 
health care professional regulation, born of the last century, is in numerous respects an 
impediment to the kinds of changes needed to fully unleash the benefits of competition 
among different types of health care service providers. To the contrary, the current system of 
licensure and related regulations tends to artificially separate professionals in ways that not 
only insulate them from competition now, but also generate incentives to use regulation to 
perpetuate and fortify such insulation in the future. Drawing on analytic principles derived 
from antitrust law enforcement and other regulated industries, the Article argues that, 
although some regulation is necessary to protect public health and safety, the legacy 
regulatory system likely impedes the development of innovative, alternate service models 
that might facilitate enhanced competition by allowing all professionals to practice to the full 
extent of their education, licensure, and skill. The Article concludes by proposing a range of 
reforms that would re-conceptualize the core characteristics and methodology of traditional 
health care professional regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The American health care system is in the midst of a major 
transformation. The structure of the industry is in flux as payment 
methods evolve and innovative care delivery systems emerge, leading 
not only to new relationships among payers, providers, and patients, but 
also to novel business models.
1
 All of these factors—combined with 
                                                     
1. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) conducted workshops in 2014 and in 2015 (the latter 
jointly with the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice) to explore a wide range of 
issues, including many that relate to this Article. See Examining Health Care Competition, FED. 
TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/03/examining-health-
care-competition [https://perma.cc/PQP6-DQDU] (last visited Feb. 1, 2016); Examining Health 
Care Competition Workshop, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-
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ongoing changes in provider education, certification, and licensure—
have complicated the answer to a central question in the health care 
marketplace: which health care professionals can safely, effectively, and 
efficiently provide for each component of the broad range of patients’ 
health care needs? 
This Article examines one key component of the U.S. health care 
system: competition between health care service providers, especially 
health care professionals. Varied and regulated professionals deliver an 
ever-widening range of health care services to patients, in many different 
settings and at every level of care. While each profession is in certain 
respects discrete, the scope of practice of each category of caregiver is 
likely to overlap with that of another, especially when professionals are 
permitted to practice to the full extent of their education, certification, 
training, and experience. As a result of this overlap, different types of 
providers may become—or be perceived as—competitors for the safe 
and effective delivery of some health care services. General practice 
physicians can encroach on specialists, advanced practice registered 
nurses can encroach on physicians, or professionals licensed in one state 
can remotely provide services to patients located elsewhere, intruding 
upon the practices of local professionals.
2
 The ability to flexibly deploy 
different types of practitioners to perform some of the same services, and 
the competition this flexibility may engender, can make a valuable 
                                                     
calendar/2015/02/examining-health-care-competition [https://perma.cc/B64G-9ZQT] (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2016) (providing workshop agendas, transcripts, and presentations). 
2. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the broader potential “mismatch” between 
existing regulations and modern health care delivery outside of the licensure context. Examples do, 
however, abound. See, e.g., Karen A. Goldman et al., Panel Discussion: Innovations in Health Care 
Delivery, in MARCH 20, 2014 WORKSHOP TRANSCRIPT: EXAMINING HEALTH CARE COMPETITION 
67, 67–122 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/200361/ 
transcriptmar20.pdf [https://perma.cc/B64G-9ZQT] (discussing, inter alia, the extent to which 
licensure and reimbursement regulations may affect telehealth innovation and deployment, and 
whether certain regulatory restrictions may or may not be necessary to promote quality and 
availability of care); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., CHRONIC CARE MANAGEMENT SERVICES (2015), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-
Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/ 
ChronicCareManagement.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4S9-GA4T] (explaining new Medicare 
reimbursement mechanism for clinical staff time spent on non-face-to-face care coordination for 
patients with multiple chronic conditions); Samuel T. Edwards & Bruce E. Landon, Medicare’s 
Chronic Care Management Payment – Payment Reform for Primary Care, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2049 (2014), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1410790 [https://perma.cc/64T9-
7QBM] (describing new Medicare reimbursement policy and praising “investment in primary care 
that may contribute to the development of a value-oriented health care system,” but also outlining 
potential implementation challenges, including the risk that reimbursement methodology may not 
alter financial incentives sufficiently to trigger practice transformations that would constrain costs 
without sacrificing quality or access). 
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contribution to the system’s ability to achieve lower costs, expanded 
access, and increased quality of care.
3
 It may also be one reason why 
friction between various types of caregivers has persisted for a long time 
and appears to be on the rise.
4
 
Most health care service providers practice under varied, 
longstanding, and pervasive regulatory regimes, primarily created at the 
state level.
5
 Some of these regimes have roots in the origins of the 
modern American medical system. They have developed over decades 
and tend to reflect the educational systems, training regimens, 
expectations, and mores of their times.
6
 Reflecting those times, these 
regulations may entrench specific business and care delivery models, 
creating what might be characterized as “regulatory barriers by design” 
for some new types of providers.
7
 This may be especially true for those 
who seek to provide the same services as incumbent providers do 
through innovative practice or business models that do not readily fit 
within established regulations. Further complicating the competitive 
landscape, these regulations often are administered by self-interested, 
nominally state boards constituted either of the very professionals to be 
                                                     
3. See infra note 9 and accompanying text. 
4. See, e.g., STEPHEN ISAACS & PAUL JELLINEK, PHYSICIANS’ FOUND., ACCEPT NO SUBSTITUTE: 
A REPORT ON SCOPE OF PRACTICE 1 (2012), http://www.physiciansfoundation.org/ 
uploads/default/A_Report_on_Scope_of_Practice.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4BP-P4X8]. In their 
report, Isaacs and Jellinek note that 
[o]ne of the most persistent and vexing challenges facing practicing physicians and the 
organizations that represent them—and an issue with profound implications for health care in 
this country—has been the growing demand by a broad array of non-physician providers for 
state legislatures to expand their scope of practice into areas that until now have been restricted 
to physicians. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . [T]he pressure is relentless, driven by a range of underlying social, economic and political 
forces. 
Id.; cf. AM. ASS’N OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, ISSUES AT-A-GLANCE: FULL PRACTICE AUTHORITY 
1 (2015), https://www.aanp.org/images/documents/policy-toolbox/fullpracticeauthority.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2T2E-SSQU]. 
There is a disconnect between the higher level of care that nurse practitioners are prepared to 
provide and the limited level of care that outdated state practice laws will allow them to deliver 
to patients. Closing this gap between clinical preparation and regulated practice authority will 
help end some of the obstacles that patients encounter when they seek health care. 
Id. 
5. See infra Section I.C. 
6. Id. 
7. See Andrew I. Gavil, The FTC’s Study and Advocacy Authority in Its Second Century: A Look 
Ahead, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 1912 (2015) (“[B]ecause regulations tend to reflect the 
features of the business models of a specific time period, they can favor incumbent firms over 
challengers by entrenching a particular business method and insulating the firms that use it from 
new sources of competition.”). 
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regulated or their competitors. And those professionals may interpret 
existing laws and regulations in ways that limit new sources of 
competition, and may have both the means and incentive to extend these 
protections through even more restrictive regulations.
8
 
Existing regulations and regulatory systems, therefore, may not be 
consonant with the expectations, capabilities, and needs of the changing 
health care environment. To the contrary, these laws and regulations, 
and the traditional way in which they have been administered, together 
can erect hurdles in the path of competition and innovation. Instead of 
being conducive to change, they can impede it in whole or in part, are 
susceptible to manipulation, and invite efforts to impose new restrictions 
to slow or arrest the development of new, expanded, and non-traditional 
models of providing health care services. Some health care providers 
thus have faced significant challenges when they seek to utilize their full 
knowledge, training, and skills to provide safe and effective care.
9
 By 
contrast, more flexible and forward-facing regulations could allow for 
greater mobility in the health care work force, enabling caregivers to 
respond to changes in demand in different regions, states, and locales. 
By allowing for wider use of the full-range of expertise of all health care 
service providers, such regulations could more effectively support care 
delivery teams that are structured and deployed to best meet patient 
needs. 
This Article examines a classic regulatory dilemma that has surfaced 
in the context of the health care professions: are certain features of the 
current system of provider regulation a mismatch for the needs of a 
                                                     
8. In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 
(2015), the United States Supreme Court explained the problem as it relates to the scope of the 
antitrust state action doctrine: 
Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when the State seeks to delegate its 
regulatory power to active market participants, for established ethical standards may blend with 
private anticompetitive motives in a way difficult even for market participants to discern. Dual 
allegiances are not always apparent to an actor. In consequence, active market participants 
cannot be allowed to regulate their own markets free from antitrust accountability. 
Id. at 1111. 
9. See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE BDS. OF NURSING, CHANGES IN HEALTHCARE 
PROFESSIONS’ SCOPE OF PRACTICE: LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 3 (2009), 
https://www.ncsbn.org/ScopeofPractice_09.pdf [perma.cc/BL5R-74PN]. As the report notes, 
[p]roposed changes to a healthcare professions’ scope of practice often elicit strongly worded 
comments from several professional interest groups. Typically, these debates are perceived as 
turf battles between two or more professions, with the common refrain of “this is part of my 
practice so it can’t be part of yours.” Often lost among the competing arguments and assertions 
are the most important issues of whether this proposed change will better protect the public and 
enhance consumers’ access to competent healthcare services. 
Id. 
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changing health care marketplace?
10
 It concludes that if the goals of 
lower cost, expanded access, and increased quality of care are to be 
realized, some important features of these established regulatory 
schemes will need to change. All providers of health care services 
should be free to practice to the “top of their license”—that is, to the full 
extent of their education, certification, and training.
11
 Given a broad 
range of service providers, it is inevitable that there will be overlap in 
the capabilities of professionals to provide some of the same services. 
Some of these service providers, however, have been cordoned off into 
distinct and restricted silos created by law and regulation—sometimes as 
an unintended consequence, and sometimes deliberately and without 
justification—thereby unnecessarily restricting competition.12 Although 
licensure and related regulation can serve important public purposes, 
competition considerations should be more fully integrated into the 
process of deciding who should provide any specific service. The answer 
to that question should not derive solely from historical regulatory 
distinctions that cannot be justified today by legitimate safety or quality 
concerns. Neither should it be influenced by the efforts of self-interested 
professionals today, who seek to use the regulatory process to erect 
additional barriers that impede new competitive challenges.
13
 The health 
care work force of the early twenty-first century will need to be more 
mobile, adaptable, innovative, and flexible, and it will need to be 
governed by a regulatory philosophy and mechanisms that facilitate 
those characteristics. In particular, standards for licensure ideally should 
be more uniform across state lines, tied to functional skills and 
qualifications rather than arbitrary categories, and determined via a 
                                                     
10. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 191–96 (1982) (arguing that regulations 
should be calibrated to “match” the perceived market defect they are intended to redress). 
11. While this principle holds generally for all health care providers, the assertion often is 
articulated with respect to nursing scope of practice, in particular. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., NAT’L 
ACAD. OF SCIS., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH (2011) 
[hereinafter IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT], http://iom.nationalacademies.org/Reports/ 
2010/The-Future-of-Nursing-Leading-Change-Advancing-Health.aspx [https://perma.cc/S9QU-
K89E]; id. at 4 (stating as one of four “key messages” that “[n]urses should practice to the full 
extent of their education and training”); id. at 72–76 (“Care teams need to make the best use of each 
member’s education, skill, and expertise, and all health professionals need to practice to the full 
extent of their license and education.”); id. at 144 (“If the current conflicts between what nurses can 
do based on their education and training and what they may do according to state and federal 
policies and regulations are not addressed, patients will continue to experience limited access to 
high-quality care.”). 
12. See infra notes 28–41, 54–55 and accompanying text (providing examples of such 
regulations). 
13. See infra notes 125–29 and accompanying text (discussing accreditation standards for dental 
therapy education programs). 
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process that does not vest one type of professional with gatekeeping 
power over another. 
Part I sets out four basic assumptions about the role of health care 
service providers in today’s health care marketplace. First, as the system 
continues to evolve, many health care professionals’ training and 
experience will overlap with others’, leading to increased competition 
and consequent turf battles over the scope of practice. Second, demands 
to harmonize the goals of cost containment, increased quality, and 
enhanced value will continue to intensify. Third, given the tendency to 
regulate healthcare professionals using “silos” carved out from the 
practice of medicine and heavily influenced by competing professionals, 
today’s regulatory approach is not well-suited to adaptations that will 
unleash, rather than constrain, competition. And finally, the specific 
characteristics of that current regulatory approach also generate 
incentives, likely to grow, to use regulation to stifle rather than facilitate 
competition. 
Part II begins with an overview of three areas of antitrust law 
enforcement that together provide a useful framework for evaluating 
anticompetitive regulations in the health care sector: the law and 
economics of exclusion, suppression of innovation, and the coordinated 
conduct of professionals and their trade groups. This framework helps to 
illuminate the economic mechanisms of regulatory exclusion that 
characterize the most objectionable types of regulations. As is true of 
exclusionary conduct that violates the antitrust laws, exclusion can occur 
when laws or regulations impose additional and unjustified burdens and 
costs on service providers thereby impeding new entry or expansion of 
services without any related benefits for consumers. The result is harm 
to competition, which can take the form of higher prices and lower 
output of services, reduced quality, reduced service, or less innovation in 
business and care delivery models.  
In important ways, anticompetitive regulations in the health care 
sector share common characteristics with private conduct that has been 
challenged under the federal antitrust laws in these three areas. They can 
also frustrate the goals of health care reform. To illustrate the 
connection, Part II then surveys a sampling of specific regulations 
affecting a range of regulated health care professions, some established 
and others still emerging. Although regulations that protect legitimate 
concerns for public health and safety are necessary, this sampling 
demonstrates why decision-makers should more fully integrate a 
competitive effects analysis into their deliberations to ensure that any 
restrictions on competition are both warranted and, if so, no greater than 
necessary to mitigate genuine health and safety risks.  
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Part III begins by providing a guide for regulators, which builds on 
the law, economics, and regulatory examples examined in Part II. It 
explains how exclusionary regulations impose impediments to 
competition that can range in their impact: from absolute barriers to 
entry, to significant entry-deterring strategies, to mere annoyances that 
can be overcome but still impose costs. We categorize the range of 
exclusionary mechanisms to facilitate future recognition and 
consideration of their likely competitive effects by lawmakers and 
regulators. Part III also provides regulators with a set of useful questions 
to answer that will assist them to identify and evaluate potentially 
exclusionary regulations in the health care sector. 
Part III concludes by challenging legislators, regulators, and health 
care industry stakeholders alike to envision a different regulatory future, 
in which competition principles better inform regulatory choices. It 
outlines select principles that could help to identify reasonable, but more 
conceptual and therefore more flexible, regulations for the modern 
health care workforce. For example, as the health care system continues 
to transition, legislators and regulators might consider moving beyond 
static, profession- and credential-specific models for specifying how 
each profession, as if in a silo, can safely go about providing services. 
They could consider more generally expressed performance, quality, and 
ethical benchmarks, which might work in lieu of or in tandem with more 
traditional specifications of the range of services that each provider can 
deliver safely and effectively. They might increasingly consider using 
regional or national compacts that would generalize standards beyond 
state boundaries. They might also consider how best to administer their 
regulatory systems to make them less prone to local capture by self-
interested professionals who participate in the markets to be regulated. 
I. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF HEALTH CARE 
SERVICE PROVIDERS IN TODAY’S HEALTH CARE 
MARKETPLACE 
In this Part, the Article distills a few underlying assumptions about 
the current state of the health care industry and its likely near-term 
direction, particularly with respect to the role of health care service 
providers. These baseline assumptions provide context for the 
subsequent analysis of the regulation of health occupations. 
Nearly all health policy discussions today flow from the so-called 
“triple aim” of health care reform, the original formulation of which 
includes three dimensions: “[i]mproving the [individual] patient 
experience of care (including quality and satisfaction); [i]mproving the 
health of populations; and [r]educing the per capita cost of health 
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care.”14 To achieve the triple aim, all of the institutional players in the 
health care industry must pursue strategies that will harness the benefits 
of competition. These strategies will necessarily include an examination 
of the role of health care professionals and a concerted effort to adapt 
long-standing regulatory approaches to the changing needs of the 
industry. 
A. Increased Overlap of Service Capabilities Will Lead to Greater 
Competition Between Health Care Professionals 
To maximize the efficiency of the health care system and ensure 
adequate access to quality care, all providers of health care services must 
be allowed and encouraged to practice to the top of their license, 
utilizing the full extent of their training, skills, and experience to provide 
safe and effective care. As the health care workforce evolves to fulfill 
that promise, however, it is inevitable that the services performed by 
different types of health care providers will increasingly overlap. In 
market terms, providers will compete to provide services that fall within 
the competency of more than one profession. For example, the skills of 
physicians and nurses can overlap somewhat, especially in primary care 
settings.
15
 Although these two types of professionals are not broad 
substitutes for each other and their skill sets are largely complementary, 
as is depicted in Figure 1, the two sets of services do intersect, which 
                                                     
14. The IHI Triple Aim, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, http://www.ihi.org/engage 
/initiatives/tripleaim/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/EN5X-M39G] (last visited Feb. 3, 2016); 
Donald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27 HEALTH AFF. 759 (2008). 
While the Institute for Healthcare Improvement developed the initial framework, the triple aim 
terminology and concept have been widely adopted in health policy circles, in no small part because 
implementation of the triple aim goals was Dr. Berwick’s self-professed “main focus” during his 
tenure as Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) from July 2010 
through December 2011. See, e.g., Chris Fleming, Berwick Brings the “Triple Aim” to CMS, 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 14, 2010), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/09/14/berwick-brings-the-
triple-aim-to-cms/ [https://perma.cc/QNF4-2FSA]. The triple aim is closely aligned with, but not 
identical to, the earlier concept of the health care “iron triangle” of access, quality, and cost 
containment. See WILLIAM L. KISSICK, MEDICINE’S DILEMMAS: INFINITE NEEDS VERSUS FINITE 
RESOURCES 2 (1994) (“[A]ccess, quality, and cost containment have equal angles, representing 
identical priorities, and an expansion of any one angle compromises one or both of the other two.”). 
15. See, e.g., Health Policy Briefs, Nurse Practitioners and Primary Care (Updated), HEALTH 
AFF. (May 15, 2013), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=92 
[https://perma.cc/8Q8W-QBY5] (“Primary care comprises a broad range of services, including the 
initial evaluation of new symptoms, ongoing care for chronic diseases, and preventive services such 
as immunizations or screenings. . . . Primary care services can be provided by physicians and by a 
range of nonphysician practitioners, such as physician assistants [“PAs”] and nurse practitioners 
[“NPs”], both of whom have graduate degrees and are authorized to examine, diagnose, and treat 
patients.”). 
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means there are a substantial number of services for which physicians 
and nurses could be practical and economic substitutes.
16
 
 
                                                     
16. The lists of services offered by so-called “retail clinics” run by major pharmacy chains, such 
as CVS and Walgreens, provide a useful real-world example of the breadth of overlap as determined 
by firms that sell primary care services. These clinics typically are staffed by NPs or, occasionally, 
PAs. See, e.g., Services, CVS MINUTE CLINIC, http://www.cvs.com/minuteclinic/services 
[https://perma.cc/QA97-VVK9] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016); Our Services, WALGREENS HEALTH 
CLINIC, http://www.walgreens.com/topic/pharmacy/healthcare-clinic/our-services.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/56MH-LYTK] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016); see also AM. NURSES ASS’N, 
ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSING: A NEW AGE IN HEALTH CARE 2 (2011), 
http://www.nursingworld.org/FunctionalMenuCategories/MediaResources/MediaBackgrounders/A
PRN-A-New-Age-in-Health-Care.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYC3-DCLA] (“NPs take health histories; 
conduct physical exams; diagnose and treat common acute illnesses and injuries; give 
immunizations; manage high blood pressure, diabetes, and other chronic conditions; order and 
interpret X-rays and other laboratory tests; counsel patients on disease prevention and healthy 
lifestyles; and refer patients to other health providers as needed.”). See generally NAT’L 
GOVERNORS ASS’N, NGA PAPER: THE ROLE OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS IN MEETING INCREASING 
DEMAND FOR PRIMARY CARE (2012) [hereinafter NGA NP PAPER], 
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1212NursePractitionersPaper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7UKA-KRTS] (drawing conclusions based on literature review of empirical work 
and meta-analyses regarding NP performance). As the NGA NP Paper concludes, 
[r]esearch suggests that NPs can perform many primary care services as well as physicians do 
and achieve equal or higher patient satisfaction rates among their patients . . . . None of the 
studies in NGA’s literature review raise concerns about the quality of care offered by NPs. 
Most studies showed that NP-provided care is comparable to physician-provided care on 
several process and outcome measures. Moreover, the studies suggest that NPs may provide 
improved access to care. 
Id. at 7–8. Although this Article focuses primarily on overlaps between physicians and nurses, it is 
useful to recognize that overlaps occur in other contexts as well, such as between primary care 
physicians and specialists, or between hospital-based and office-based practitioners. 
Figure 1: Opportunities for Competition 
Services typically 
provided by 
physicians 
Services typically 
provided by nurses 
Services that may be provided safely 
and effectively by physicians or nurses: 
• Take and interpret health histories 
• Conduct physical exams 
• Diagnose, treat, and prescribe medications for 
common acute illnesses 
• Diagnose and treat common acute injuries  
and wounds 
• Manage chronic conditions, such as high 
blood pressure and diabetes 
• Order and interpret X-rays and other 
laboratory tests 
• Counsel patients on health maintenance and 
disease prevention 
• Provide referrals to other health care 
providers, as needed 
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Similar diagrams could be drawn to depict other examples of likely 
service overlap, where the overlap represents opportunities for 
competition. 
Moreover, as hospitals increasingly serve as focal points for 
comprehensive health care systems—whether through some degree of 
vertical integration, contractual affiliations, or other alliances—they are 
paying closer attention to the relative efficiency and quality of care 
delivered in outpatient care delivery settings beyond the hospital itself.
17
 
This trend may create an additional dimension of competition between 
health systems as they seek to maximize profits across the entire 
continuum of inpatient and outpatient care by, for example: acquiring or 
partnering with local physicians in outpatient primary care and specialty 
practices; competing to build loyalty among patients, who may perceive 
benefits from centralizing their outpatient care within a particular 
system; and incentivizing physicians to drive inpatient referrals to the 
system’s hospital facilities.18 This type of integration is also likely to 
exacerbate existing tensions between different types of health care 
                                                     
17. In a vertically-integrated hospital system, the quality and efficiency of care outside the 
hospital obviously contribute to the system’s financial bottom line. This is even more true if health 
care services are reimbursed under a bundled payment methodology. See, e.g., Comprehensive Care 
for Joint Replacement Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/cjr [https://perma.cc/2H7N-7HN6] (last updated Jan. 29, 
2016). Under the new Medicare program, certain hospitals will be held accountable for an entire 
“episode of care” for a hip or knee replacement, including almost all related items and outpatient 
services that normally would be covered by Medicare, beginning at hospital admission and ending 
ninety days after discharge. Id. In addition, under changes to Medicare that were first implemented 
in 2012 and have been refined annually, most hospitals now face an explicit financial penalty for 
“excess” readmissions (defined according to specific criteria), which may be affected by the level of 
communication with outpatient providers upon discharge, as well as the amount and quality of post-
discharge care. See Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.150–.154 (2016) 
(implementing the readmissions penalty program created by the Affordable Care Act); 
Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/acuteinpatientpps/readmissions-
reduction-program.html [https://perma.cc/8ER2-4RBR] (last updated Feb. 4, 2016). 
18. See, e.g., BERKELEY FORUM FOR IMPROVING CALIFORNIA’S HEALTHCARE DELIVERY SYS., A 
NEW VISION FOR CALIFORNIA’S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: INTEGRATED CARE WITH ALIGNED 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 38 (2013), http://berkeleyhealthcareforum.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/A-New-Vision-for-California%E2%80%99s-Healthcare-System.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3TSH-K7EG] (suggesting that, while greater employment of physicians by 
hospitals may improve clinical integration and care coordination, it may also raise costs, because 
care provided at hospitals may be reimbursed at higher rates, and also because “physicians may be 
influenced by hospitals to order more expensive care or increase referrals and admissions”); Saint 
Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., Nos. 12-CV-00560-BLW, 13-
CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *13 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 
2015) (discussing typical referral practice patterns that result from integration in the context of an 
analysis of the potential anticompetitive effects of a hospital system’s acquisition of a large 
multispecialty physician group).  
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providers as traditional office-based, physician-led practices face new 
financial pressures from affiliated systems looking to contain overall 
costs.
19
 
B.  Demands to Harmonize Cost, Quality, and Value Will Continue to 
Intensify 
Another common triple aim theme is greater emphasis on value, 
which explicitly recognizes the relationship between quality and cost, 
and also prioritizes outcomes over procedures.
20
 Several major health 
care reform efforts seek to promote value over volume by fine-tuning 
reimbursement methodologies to disincentivize unnecessary, 
duplicative, or otherwise low-value services that do not appear to 
promote better health outcomes. Some of these new payment models 
also seek to harness the power of competition by explicitly rewarding 
value-based care and better outcomes.
21
 In response, existing care 
                                                     
19. The services provided by hospitals and hospital-based health care professionals, for example, 
are increasingly overlapping with the services provided by freestanding physician practice groups. 
This was a phenomenon explored by the FTC and the Ninth Circuit in Saint Alphonsus Medical 
Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015), in which the 
FTC and the State of Idaho successfully challenged the acquisition by a hospital of a physician 
practice group because it would substantially reduce competition. 
20. See generally Michael E. Porter, What Is Value in Health Care?, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2477 
(2010). 
Achieving high value for patients must become the overarching goal of health care delivery, 
with value defined as the health outcomes achieved per dollar spent. 
. . . .  
. . . Since value depends on results, not inputs, value in health care is measured by the 
outcomes achieved, not the volume of services delivered, and shifting focus from volume to 
value is a central challenge. Nor is value measured by the process of care used; process 
measurement and improvement are important tactics but are no substitutes for measuring 
outcomes and costs. 
Id. at 2477. 
21. For example, the CMS Innovation Center has launched a number of Accountable Care 
Organization (ACO) and related demonstration models designed to reimburse services provided to 
Medicare beneficiaries differently than the traditional fee-for-service approach. The Medicare 
Shared Savings Program (MSSP) ACO model encourages providers to form groups that will 
coordinate care for a defined group of patients in a variety of settings, incentivized in part by the 
promise of bonus payments (on top of traditional fee-for-service payments) if the ACO’s provider 
members meet or exceed certain quality standards and cost savings for those patients. See generally 
Shared Savings Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/ 
Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
7GD3-5TFJ] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016). Taking this approach one step further, the Pioneer ACO 
model offers participating providers not only the carrot of shared savings, but also the stick of 
having to pay back CMS for shared losses if the ACO fails to meet certain quality and cost targets. 
See generally Pioneer ACO Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Pioneer-ACO-Model/ [https://perma.cc/HJ2P-2YXK] (last 
visited Feb 4, 2016). The CMS Innovation Center continues to develop additional models that will 
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delivery models are evolving and new models are emerging, relying on 
greater collaboration, coordination, and financial interdependence 
among various types of health care providers according to a flexible, 
team-based approach.
22
 Ideally, responsibilities would be allocated 
functionally—based on which type of professional is available, 
qualified, and able to deliver the best value. From the perspective of 
some health care professionals, however, this challenges the traditional 
hierarchical structure of medicine, whereby supervising physicians 
typically make decisions and issue orders to authorize the actions of 
other members of the care delivery team whose autonomy is limited.
23
 
                                                     
shift provider reimbursement methodologies from volume to value. See, e.g., Next Generation ACO 
Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Next-
Generation-ACO-Model/ [https://perma.cc/X4LS-2HMW] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016); 
Comprehensive ESRD Care Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/comprehensive-ESRD-care/ [https://perma.cc/K7JW-APM8] 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2016) (providing information regarding an accountable care model to cover 
Medicare patients undergoing treatment for End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD)). See generally 
Innovation Models, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/index.html#views=models [https://perma.cc/Q4YM-DUQE] 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2016). 
22. See generally Atul Gawande, Cowboys and Pit Crews, NEW YORKER (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/cowboys-and-pit-crews [https://perma.cc/W7JJ-
SYNM] (Harvard Medical School commencement address arguing, inter alia, that medicine has 
become so complex that the lone “cowboy” model of practice no longer works; rather, a 
coordinated, team-based, “pit crew” approach is required, including realignment of financial 
incentives; “[w]e have every indication . . . that where people in medicine combine their talents and 
efforts to design organized service to patients and local communities, extraordinary change can 
result”). 
The Next Generation ACO Model, while limited to the Medicare context, is a good example of 
how this vision might be realized more broadly throughout the U.S. health care system. Next 
Generation Medicare ACOs—comprising hospitals, physicians, nurses, and various other health 
care providers and suppliers—will receive financial incentives to enhance coordination among team 
members and achieve high-quality care, while reducing costs and improving the overall patient 
experience. Next Generation ACO Model, supra note 21. Target participating providers are 
experienced in coordinating care and willing to assume greater financial risk, in return for the 
promise of greater rewards if they meet financial and clinical outcome goals. The program will 
supply ACO participating providers with additional tools to support coordinated care management 
and patient engagement by the entire provider team. Id.; see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., NEXT GENERATION ACO MODEL: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2015), 
https://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/nextgenacofaq.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJX4-6F3E] (“‘[B]enefit 
enhancement’ tools to help ACOs improve engagement with beneficiaries” will include “greater 
access to home visits, telehealth services, and skilled nursing facility services.”). 
23. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ASSESSING PROGRESS ON THE INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE REPORT THE FUTURE OF NURSING 2–9 (2015), http://download.nap.edu/ 
cart/download.cgi?&record_id=21838 [https://perma.cc/Y5VN-PZCC] (prepublication copy, 
uncorrected proofs) (discussing transformation to value-based care, triple aim goals, and greater 
emphasis on collaboration among different types of providers, within context of report section 
advocating generally for expanded scope of practice for nurses). 
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C.  The Current Regulatory Framework Will Prove Increasingly 
Incapable of Adapting to Changes in the Industry 
These developments and trends highlight the deficiencies of the U.S. 
system of regulation for health care professionals, which is not well 
suited to attain the triple aim goals. It neither encourages appropriate 
competition among different types of qualified health care providers, nor 
supports an increasingly collaborative environment based on cross-
functional provider teams whose members practice to the full extent of 
their training and competence. Rather, the traditional approach to health 
care professional licensure tends to create “silos” that promote and 
sustain counterproductive turf battles between different types of health 
care providers, especially physicians and nurses.
24
 In competition policy 
terms, these kinds of regulations establish a division of service markets 
that, if achieved through private conduct, would be likely condemned as 
unlawful.
25
 
Physicians in the United States are licensed by individual states, 
pursuant to very broad and general definitions of the practice of 
medicine.
26
 Although specialists and subspecialists receive additional 
training and certification compared to general practitioners, state 
practice laws typically confer a broad license to practice medicine and 
surgery on all physicians in a given state.
27
 
                                                     
24. See infra notes 28–41. 
25. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (holding that an agreement by rivals 
to divide markets and customers was a per se violation of the antitrust laws). 
26. For a representative example, see section 18.71.011 of the Revised Code of Washington: 
A person is practicing medicine if he does one or more of the following: 
 
(1) Offers or undertakes to diagnose, cure, advise or prescribe for any human disease, 
ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition, physical or mental, real or 
imaginary, by any means or instrumentality; 
(2) Administers or prescribes drugs or medicinal preparations to be used by any other 
person; 
(3) Severs or penetrates the tissues of human beings; 
(4) Uses on cards, books, papers, signs or other written or printed means of giving 
information to the public, in the conduct of any occupation or profession pertaining to 
the diagnosis or treatment of human disease or conditions the designation “doctor of 
medicine”, “physician”, “surgeon”, “m.d.” or any combination thereof unless such 
designation additionally contains the description of another branch of the healing arts 
for which a person has a license . . . . 
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.71.011 (2016).  
27. “By the early 20th century, each state had adopted a so-called ‘medical practice act’ that 
essentially claimed the entire human condition as the exclusive province of medicine. The statutory 
definitions of physicians’ scope of practice were—and remain—extremely broad.” Barbara J. 
Safriet, Federal Options for Maximizing the Value of Advanced Practice Nurses in Providing 
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In stark contrast, almost every other health profession, including 
nursing, is regulated pursuant to a licensure scheme based on “carve-
outs” from the practice of medicine.28 The licensure laws and regulations 
typically define a rigid “scope of practice” based on permission to 
perform an enumerated set of procedures and services.
29
 For example, if 
a service is not specifically listed as within the scope of practice for an 
Advanced Practice Registered Nurse (APRN) in a given state, an APRN 
in that state is not authorized to perform the service, even if her training 
and experience would enable her to do so safely and effectively.
30
 This 
                                                     
Quality, Cost-Effective Health Care, in IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 11, at 443, 
451 app. H. In theory—and setting aside important ethical and liability issues—a general 
practitioner could perform neurosurgery without violating the scope of a state-granted license to 
practice medicine. 
28. See, e.g., Safriet, supra note 27, at 452 (“[T]he real mischief was accomplished through 
corresponding provisions making it illegal for anyone not licensed as a physician to undertake any 
of the acts included in the definition.”); id. at 450 (“[T]he scopes of practice for [advanced practice 
nurses] (and other health professionals) are exercises in legislative exception making a ‘carving out’ 
of small, politically achievable spheres of practice authority from the universal domain of 
medicine.”); see also NGA NP PAPER, supra note 16, at 3 (“State medical laws originated by 
defining the practice of medicine expansively and restricting such activities to licensed physicians. 
Subsequent efforts to alter scope of practice laws to account for other developing health professions 
have taken the form of ‘carving out’ services that non-physician providers could perform.”). 
29. See, for example, Washington Administrative Code sections 246-840-300 to -455, for a 
comprehensive set of regulations (beyond the state’s nursing licensure statute) that spell out 
precisely what an advanced registered nurse practitioner (ARNP) in the State of Washington is 
allowed to do. Conversely, an ARNP would run the risk of being accused of the unlawful practice of 
medicine if he or she performed any service not specifically enumerated in these regulations. Even 
in Washington—a state with broad practice authority for advanced practice nurses—the initial 
regulatory section defining an ARNP’s basic scope of practice is detailed. 
Under subsection 246-840-300(6) of the Washington Administrative Code: 
Performing within the scope of the ARNP’s knowledge, experience and practice, the licensed 
ARNP may perform the following: 
(a) Examine patients and establish diagnoses by patient history, physical examination and 
other methods of assessment; 
(b) Admit, manage and discharge patients to and from health care facilities; 
(c) Order, collect, perform and interpret diagnostic tests; 
(d) Manage health care by identifying, developing, implementing and evaluating a plan of 
care and treatment for patients; 
(e) Prescribe therapies and medical equipment; 
(f) Prescribe medications when granted authority under this chapter; 
(g) Refer patients to other health care practitioners, services or facilities; and 
(h) Perform procedures or provide care services that are within the scope of practice 
according to the commission approved certification program. 
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-840-300(6) (2016).   
30. A common example is prescriptive authority. For example, consider the case of an APRN 
who has practiced for many years in a state like Wyoming, where licensed APRNs are authorized to 
independently write a wide range of prescriptions, including antibiotics to treat basic infections. 
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regulatory approach likely does not provide sufficient flexibility to 
enable the APRN to practice to the top of her license. The siloed 
licensure classifications based on discrete occupation names and 
regulatory code sections, rather than actual education, training, and 
skills, also tend to mask the fact that the APRN could compete directly 
with physicians to perform certain services safely and effectively.
31
 
In addition, the siloed system stifles adaptation when—as often 
happens in medicine—specialized aspects of treatment gradually 
become routine. When an innovative procedure or therapy is first 
introduced, it may be performed or prescribed only by highly specialized 
physicians. As the treatment becomes more common and routine, it may 
be incorporated into basic medical training and experience, such that 
general practitioners may become competent to provide it. An example 
might be the reading of x-rays, which all physicians are trained to do. 
When presented with a suspected broken arm, a general practitioner in 
an urgent care clinic or emergency room could and would review an x-
ray in the first instance and make an initial diagnosis, even if a 
specialized radiologist might later review the image to confirm. Because 
physicians practice under a broad license, with full discretion to 
determine the appropriate standard of care as it relates to their own 
capabilities, if a general practitioner determined she possessed adequate 
skills to read such an x-ray, she already would be automatically licensed 
                                                     
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-21-120 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.) (defining APRN to 
include a nurse who “[m]ay prescribe, administer, dispense or provide nonprescriptive and 
prescriptive medications”); see also 024-054-003 WYO. CODE R. § 2 (LexisNexis 2016) (governing 
“Scope and Standards of Nursing Practice for the APRN”); id. § 2(b) (governing “Prescriptive 
Authority”). Suppose that, over the years, the APRN has appropriately written thousands of 
prescriptions for antibiotics for routine ear infections, sinus infections, urinary tract infections, and 
the like. If the same APRN moved to Texas and obtained licensure there, he would no longer have 
any prescribing authority, unless he demonstrated advanced pharmacotherapeutics education, 
applied separately for prescriptive authority (beyond his licensure application), applied separately 
for prescribing authority for each population focus (e.g., children, women, etc.), and obtained and 
filed with the Texas Medical Board a written delegation of prescriptive authority from a specific 
supervising physician. See 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 222.1–.10 (2016) (governing “Advanced 
Practice Registered Nurses with Prescriptive Authority”); id. § 222.4 (governing “Minimum 
Standards for Prescribing or Ordering Drugs and Devices”). 
31. See Roger D. Blair & Christine Piette Durrance, Economic Effects of Licensing Health Care 
Professions, 28 ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., Apr. 2015, at 29, 30 (describing that the 
medical profession controls licensure by defining the practice of medicine broadly, which denies 
consumers the ability to substitute the services of lower-cost providers); Jennifer Perloff et al., 
Comparing the Cost of Care Provided to Medicare Beneficiaries Assigned to Primary Care Nurse 
Practitioners and Physicians, 70 HEALTH SERVS. RES. (2015), 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6773.12425/epdf [https://perma.cc/4MLH-Y929] 
(concluding that cost of care for Medicare beneficiaries managed by nurse practitioners was lower 
compared to those managed by primary care physicians). 
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to provide that service. In contrast, even when a service or treatment 
becomes routine and is incorporated into APRN training and experience, 
such that APRNs are competent to provide it independently, static 
scope-of-practice carve-outs for nurses may prevent APRNs from 
providing the service. APRNs—unlike physicians—likely would need to 
seek specific legislative or regulatory changes, to expand their legal 
scope of practice to match their capabilities.
32
 
                                                     
32. The evolution of Georgia’s APRN supervision requirements provides a stark example. Under 
the state’s 1989 nurse protocol statute, Georgia APRNs were able to order radiographic imaging 
tests when such authority had been delegated by a supervising physician. Professions and 
Business—Physician’s Assistants; Nurses; Authority to Order or Dispense Drugs, Medical 
Treatments, or Diagnostic Studies, § 3, 1989 GA. LAWS 261, 261. Georgia APRNs lost most of their 
authority to order these tests—even if a physician is willing to delegate such authority—when, in 
2006, a revised statute provided that APRNs cannot order radiographic imaging except in a “life 
threatening” situation. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-25 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). For 
an account of these changes, see James F. Lawrence, Key Legislative Points Impacting APRNs in 
Georgia: A History of Important Legislation of APRNs in Georgia, UNITED ADVANCED PRACTICE 
REGISTERED NURSES GA., https://uaprn.enpnetwork.com/page/17851-key-legislative-points-
impacting-aprns-in-georgia [https://perma.cc/X6QY-VYHY] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
Restoration of the authority routinely delegated to APRNs between 1989 and 2006 would require 
amendments to the statute, but proposed legislative fixes have failed. See, e.g., S. 386, 151st Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012). This limitation is particularly troublesome in Georgia, a state with 
a significant population of low income and rural patients who may be disproportionately affected by 
a lack of access to care, and who may suffer from unnecessary delays in diagnosis and treatment if 
APRNs cannot independently order such tests. For additional background on Georgia’s physician 
shortage and the evolution of APRN regulation in Georgia, including its regulation of APRN 
prescriptive authority, see BETH STEPHENS, GA. WATCH, PERSPECTIVES ON ADVANCED PRACTICE 
REGISTERED NURSING IN GEORGIA (2015), http://www.georgiawatch.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/APRN01072015WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RCQ-R9XB]. The report 
describes Georgia’s APRN practice laws as “some of [the] most restrictive in the nation.” Id. at 1. 
Anesthesia care provides another good example of how APRN skills and expertise may expand 
over time, creating a challenge when laws and regulations do not keep pace. Certified Registered 
Nurse Anesthetists (CRNAs) are a specialized type of APRN trained to provide various types of 
anesthesia services. While their scope of practice differs from state to state, over time the 
independent practice authority of CRNAs has expanded in many states, such that they can provide 
services ranging from in-hospital anesthesia for surgery, to epidurals for labor and delivery, to 
outpatient interventional pain management services for chronic pain. See, e.g., IOM FUTURE OF 
NURSING REPORT, supra note 11, at 111 (“[E]vidence shows that CRNAs provide high-quality care 
[and] there is no evidence of patient harm from their practice . . . . A study by Dulisse and Cromwell 
(2010) found no increase in inpatient mortality or complications in states that [do not require] that 
an anesthesiologist or surgeon oversee the administration of anesthesia by a CRNA.” (citing Brian 
Dulisse & Jerry Cromwell, No Harm Found When Nurse Anesthetists Work Without Supervision by 
Physicians, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1469 (2010))); INST. OF MED., COMM. ON ADVANCING PAIN RES., 
CARE, & EDUC., RELIEVING PAIN IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING PREVENTION, 
CARE, EDUCATION, AND RESEARCH 11 (2011), http://www.nap.edu/read/13172/chapter/1 
[https://perma.cc/TNY5-F9DC] (recommending an increase in the number of health professionals 
with advanced expertise in pain care). See generally id.; About CRNAs, AM. ASS’N NURSE 
ANESTHETISTS, http://www.aana.com/aboutus/value-of-crnas/Pages/Facts-About-CRNAs.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/YRD3-6ME9] (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
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These problems are exacerbated by the state-by-state nature of 
occupational licensure, which affects health care providers as it does 
virtually all licensed professionals.
33
 An experienced APRN may have 
worked for many years in a state with relatively broad scope of practice 
rules; she then moves to another state where she is not be authorized to 
provide comparable services without meeting additional requirements.
34
 
In particular, an APRN who may have been licensed, and practiced 
safely and effectively for years in a state that permits “independent” 
practice (subject to the APRN’s own judgment regarding consultations 
and referrals), who then moves to a state where every APRN is required 
to have a written physician supervision agreement, may find her ability 
to practice independently severely curtailed.
35
 As Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) staff explained in a 2014 policy paper, Policy 
Perspectives: Competition and the Regulation of Advanced Practice 
Nurses,
36
 discussed in greater detail below,
37
 such physician supervision 
requirements are likely to deny consumers the benefits of competition, 
reduce access to care, and inhibit innovation in the development of new 
models of health care delivery.
38
 
In addition, regulatory silos may suppress innovation to develop new 
types of providers, including the kinds of innovation that may foster 
experimentation and comparisons across states. First, if a new approach 
to care delivery does not fit neatly into an existing silo, it may be barred 
                                                     
33. For a recent, broad survey of the expansion and competitive consequences of state licensure 
of professions and trades, see Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should 
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093 (2014). See also MORRIS 
M. KLEINER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING POLICIES (2015), 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/reform_occupational_licensing_policies
_kleiner_v4.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV6G-5LB7] (asserting that state-based occupational licensing 
systems unduly restrict competition and therefore should be reformed). 
34. See, e.g., supra note 30 (discussing state-by-state differences in prescriptive authority). 
35. The American Association of Nurse Practitioners (AANP) maintains a database that 
categorizes each state’s nursing regulations as allowing “full,” “reduced,” or “restricted” practice, 
along with links to each state’s nursing practice act and related laws and regulations. State Practice 
Environment, AM. ASS’N NURSE PRAC., https://www.aanp.org/legislation-regulation/state-
legislation/state-practice-environment [https://perma.cc/F6HA-RR2D] (last visited Feb. 5, 2016) 
[hereinafter AANP State Practice Environment Data]. Requirements for so-called “collaborative 
practice agreements,” which impose mandatory physician supervision, are the main determinative 
factor for the state-by-state categorizations. 
36. FED. TRADE COMM’N STAFF, POLICY PERSPECTIVES: COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF 
ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSES (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_ 
documents/policy-perspectives-competition-regulation-advanced-practice-nurses/140307 
aprnpolicypaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/W36H-H2RN] [hereinafter FTC APRN POLICY PAPER]. 
37. See infra notes 109–13 and accompanying text. 
38. See generally infra Section II.B (discussing regulations that may impede competition among 
health care professionals). 
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entirely until it secures some kind of statutory or regulatory approval, 
which can take years. Second, if regulators are receptive to permitting it, 
a typical approach will be to create a whole new silo rather than to adapt 
current regulations, thus exacerbating the sense of “separateness” among 
professionals and adding potentially needless regulatory complexity. 
Both approaches de-emphasize the potential for, and the perception, of 
competition. The recent and ongoing development of the dental therapy 
profession, discussed in greater detail below,
39
 is an excellent example. 
Dental therapists fall somewhere between dentists and dental hygienists: 
they typically have more training than licensed hygienists, and are 
specifically trained to provide some dental services traditionally 
provided only by licensed dentists.
40
 The profession is so new that only a 
few states have established or proposed licensure pathways and scope of 
practice definitions for dental therapists. All have created entirely new 
regulatory silos that would contain dental therapists and separate them 
from other dental professions.
41
 
Finally, two other important trends will stress the regulatory model 
for health care professionals: increasing demand and stagnant or slowly 
increasing supply, which together produce a shortage. Demand for 
health care services continues to climb, not only due to an aging 
population, but also because of the growing number of people and 
families who now have health care insurance.
42
 Many geographic areas 
                                                     
39. See infra notes 124–28 and accompanying text. 
40. “A dental therapist is a licensed oral health professional who practices as part of the dental 
team to provide educational, clinical and therapeutic patient services. Dental therapists provide 
basic preventive and restorative treatment to children and adults, and extractions of primary (baby) 
teeth under the supervision of a dentist.” Dental Therapy – A New Profession, U. MINN. SCH. 
DENTISTRY, http://dentistry.umn.edu/programs-admissions/dental-therapy/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7SWQ-DAZQ] (last updated Dec. 16, 2015). The University of Minnesota was 
one of the first schools to offer a dental therapy curriculum, and Minnesota was the first state to 
establish licensure of dental therapists. Id. 
41. For an overview of states where dental therapist licensure has been established or 
contemplated, see Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Sherin Tooks, Dir., Comm’n on Dental 
Accreditation 3–4 (Dec. 2, 2013) [hereinafter FTC 2013 CODA Comment], 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-
commission-dental-accreditation-concerning-proposed-accreditation-standards-dental/ 
131204codacomment.pdf [https://perma.cc/9USU-ETHV] (providing an overview of the Minnesota 
program); id. at 5 nn.34–37 and accompanying text (surveying other states where legislation has 
been introduced); see also id. at 4 n.21 (describing Alaska’s federally mandated Dental Health Aide 
Therapist program for Alaska Native Americans). 
42. See, e.g., HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
PROJECTING THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR PRIMARY CARE PRACTITIONERS THROUGH 2020, at 1 
(2013), http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/healthworkforce/supplydemand/usworkforce/primarycare/ 
projectingprimarycare.pdf [https://perma.cc/AK2L-9C5R] (“Demand for primary care services is 
projected to increase through 2020, due largely to aging and population growth and, to a much 
lesser extent, the expanded insurance coverage implemented under the Affordable Care Act . . . .”); 
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in the United States already are plagued by poor or inconsistent access to 
care,
43
 and provider shortages are predicted to worsen in the coming 
years.
44
 Current regulatory silos and inflexible scope-of-practice 
restrictions exacerbate provider shortages by making it more difficult to 
match the supply of skilled health care providers with patients in need of 
care. 
D. Incentives to Use Regulation to Stifle Competition Will Increase 
Whether in health care or in other areas of the economy, 
anticompetitive regulation is more likely to arise in markets that share 
certain common characteristics. These characteristics tend to make such 
markets more conducive to anticompetitive regulation, and thus increase 
the probability that incumbent suppliers will have the incentive to 
advocate for new or continued restrictive regulation.
45
 They include: (1) 
extensive regulation, often at the state or local level; (2) regulations that 
tend to reflect a dominant, “legacy” business model; (3) changing 
market conditions; (4) the emergence of new products, services, or 
business models that are incompatible with the existing regulatory 
                                                     
IHS INC., THE COMPLEXITIES OF PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND: PROJECTIONS FROM 2013 TO 
2025 (2015), https://www.aamc.org/download/426242/data/ihsreportdownload.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/BK4A-P4SV] (“Study results suggest the demand for physician services is growing faster 
than supply. While growth in the supply of APRNs and other health occupations may help to 
alleviate projected shortfalls to an extent, even taking into consideration potential changes in 
staffing, the nation will likely face a growing shortage in many physician specialties . . . .”). 
43. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) designates Health Professional 
Shortage Areas (HPSAs) for certain geographies or populations, using a variety of criteria. 
According to HRSA’s most recent data, the United States has over 6000 designated primary care 
HPSAs, over 5000 dental health HPSAs, and over 4000 mental health HPSAs (located in every 
state). Shortage Areas, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HRSA, 
http://datawarehouse.hrsa.gov/topics/shortageAreas.aspx#chart [https://perma.cc/6PA9-B5J5] (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2015) (interactive charts based on real-time data). HRSA also designates Medically 
Underserved Areas/Populations (MUA/Ps), of which there are currently over 4000 (again, in every 
state). HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICALLY 
UNDERSERVED AREAS/POPULATIONS (MUA/P) STATE SUMMARY OF DESIGNATED MUA/P, 
http://datawarehouse.hrsa.gov/tools/hdwreports/Reports.aspx# [https://perma.cc/3BWG-SJSG] 
(click on “Shortage Areas, Medically Underserved Areas/Populations (MUA/P),” then “State 
Summary” to generate report based on real-time data). 
44. Shortages of dental providers are, and will continue to be, particularly acute. See, e.g., Jane 
Koppelman, Access to Care Could Worsen as Dentist Shortages Intensify, PEW CHARITABLE TR. 
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/09/21/ 
access-to-care-could-worsen-as-dentist-shortages-intensify [https://perma.cc/B9EQ-ER96]; 
BUREAU OF HEALTH WORKFORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL AND 
STATE-LEVEL PROJECTIONS OF DENTISTS AND DENTAL HYGIENISTS IN THE U.S., 2012–2025 
(2015), http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/healthworkforce/supplydemand/dentistry/nationalstatelevelprojections 
dentists.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G5C-K3R7]. 
45. For a discussion of examples from various industries, see Gavil, supra note 7, at 1911–17. 
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framework; and (5) a consequent increase in the incentives for 
incumbents to use the regulatory process to impede new market entrants. 
These characteristics are evident today in markets as varied as electrical 
power distribution
46
 and automobile sales.
47
 They have also given rise to 
near warfare in sectors of the sharing economy,
48
 taxi and related 
transportation services,
49
 and municipal broadband,
50
 where incumbents 
                                                     
46. FTC staff have long been vocal in promoting regulatory reforms to promote competition in 
the provision of electrical power. For a recent example, see Reply Comment of the Staff of the Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Proceeding on the Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy 
Vision (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-
reply-comment-state-new-york-public-service-commission-reforming-energy-vision-
proceeding/112315nypsc.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FXK-JMV5]. Regulatory barriers may also be 
inhibiting the adoption of renewable energy sources. See, e.g., Renewable Energy, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/topics/renewable.html 
[https://perma.cc/U87Y-JFHM] (last updated July 8, 2015) (discussing “Barriers to Renewable 
Energy”). 
47. The sale and service of automobiles is extensively regulated by the states, many of which 
prohibit the direct sale of automobiles to consumers by manufacturers. The effect is to mandate that 
all consumer purchases be made through independent dealers, which stifles innovation in 
automobile distribution, such as direct-to-consumer internet-based sales. FTC staff has encouraged 
state legislators to eliminate such limitations on competition, which have been vigorously defended 
by automobile dealers and their trade associations. See, e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff 
to Darwin L. Boorher, Senator, Mich. State Senate (May 7, 2015) [hereinafter FTC Letter to Darwin 
L. Boorher], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-
regarding-michigan-senate-bill-268-which-would-create-limited-exception-
current/150511michiganautocycle.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XM3-T9WV]. A workshop was also held 
on January 19, 2016, to explore these and broader issues related to the reform of state automobile 
regulations to adapt to new automotive technologies and innovation in distribution methods. See 
Auto Distribution: Current Issues and Trends, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2016/01/auto-distribution-current-issues-future-
trends [https://perma.cc/7WFE-MMND] (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). For a description of the issues to 
be addressed at the workshop, see Tara Isa Koslov & James Frost, The FTC Opens the Hood on 
Automobile Distribution, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 14, 2015, 5:38 PM), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/12/ftc-opens-hood-automobile-
distribution [https://perma.cc/GU9B-THTJ]. 
48. For one definition, see The Power of Connection: Peer-to-Peer Businesses: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 113th Cong. 1 (2014), http://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/1-
15-2014_revised_sundararajan_testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3VU-W67W] (written statement 
of Arun Sundararajan, Professor and NEC Faculty Fellow, New York University Stern School of 
Business). The FTC conducted a workshop to explore competition issues in the “sharing economy” 
in June 2015. See The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and Regulators, 
FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2015/06/sharing-
economy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-regulators [https://perma.cc/ZE47-FAHC] (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
49. See, e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Brendan Reilly, Alderman, Chi. City 
Council (Apr. 15, 2014) [hereinafter FTC Letter to Brendan Reilly], 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-honorable-
brendan-reilly-concerning-chicago-proposed-ordinance-o2014-1367/140421chicagoridesharing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/52J9-PETX] (encouraging the City of Chicago to adopt regulations that would 
facilitate, not inhibit, the operation of ride-sharing services); Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff 
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have sought to employ the regulatory process to impede new rivals. As 
is discussed at length in Section II.B, today’s health care markets, 
especially those related to health care professionals, exhibit many if not 
all of these characteristics. 
1. Pervasive Historical Regulation 
First and foremost, these markets are already subject to detailed and 
pervasive regulation. Such regulation heightens the incentives of 
industry participants not only to become well-versed in the features and 
requirements of the regulatory system, but also to view it as a vehicle for 
promoting their self-interest. Economists have labelled the possible end 
result “regulatory capture,” which can transform regulation in whole or 
part from a method of serving the public to one focused on serving the 
interests of the regulated.
51
 The threat to competition from capture can 
be amplified when government authorities assign the task of interpreting 
and enforcing regulations to self-interested industry participants.
52
 
This is especially true in health care markets. As has already been 
discussed, health care professionals of many types have long been the 
focus of comprehensive regulation to protect the public from unqualified 
or unethical professionals. Typically, such regulations establish the 
terms of entry into a business, trade or profession, including the 
requirements for education, training, and certification or licensure. In 
                                                     
to Jacques P. Lerner, Gen. Counsel, D.C. Taxicab Comm’n (June 7, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comments-district-
columbia-taxicab-commission-concerning-proposed-rulemakings-passenger/130612dctaxicab.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3SFE-H9BZ] (encouraging District of Columbia to adopt forward-looking 
regulations that would facilitate development of new transportation services). 
50. See, e.g., Klint Finley, Chattanooga Is Offering Internet Faster than Google Fiber, WIRED 
(Oct. 15, 2015, 4:56 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/10/chattanooga-is-offering-internet-faster-
than-google-fiber/ [https://perma.cc/3432-YLPV] (noting efforts by Comcast to block lower cost, 
higher quality municipally-supplied broadband services); see also James Surowiecki, The Wait-for-
Google-to-Do-It Strategy, MIT TECH. REV. (June 23, 2015), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/review/538411/the-wait-for-google-to-do-it-strategy 
[https://perma.cc/XN55-AUUC] (describing antiquated regulatory framework for broadband and the 
competitive impact of Google Fiber’s entry). 
51. See generally DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 687–91 (4th ed. 2005) (describing and explaining capture theory). As Carlton and 
Perloff explain, because “various interest groups are affected differently by regulation and compete 
to influence legislation. . . . Those that are the best organized and most affected by regulation spend 
the most money attempting to promote their own interest through legislation and sympathetic 
regulators.” Id. at 687; see also Gavil, supra note 7, at 1911–12 (discussing the effect of capture 
theory on regulated trades and professions). 
52. This was a concern of the Supreme Court in North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners. See supra note 8. 
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competition terms, “conditions of entry” are typically established and 
evaluated by regulation.
53
 
Existing regulations also may be structured in a very particular way 
that can itself exacerbate their impact on competition. For example, and 
as observed in Section I.C, the varied service providers in the health care 
fields typically have been regulated in discrete silos that promote a 
perception of distinctiveness, both with respect to function and 
competence. As a result, different types of health care professionals 
appear to be walled off from each other even though their competencies 
can overlap. This has the effect of creating and perpetuating the 
perception by service consumers that the professions are entirely 
distinct.
54
 
2. Existing Regulations Reflect a Dominant “Legacy” Business 
Model 
A second common characteristic is that the existing regulatory 
scheme is grounded in a specific and dominant business model, often 
one that developed over decades or longer. Such regulatory schemes 
encode policy priorities and compromises that reflect past assessments 
of the marketplace, methods of doing business, and the public interest.
55
 
They will thus tend to reflect static notions of what was required to 
protect public health and safety based on the practices, research, and 
understandings of their time. These regulations may also consciously or 
                                                     
53. See, e.g., FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 12 (“Licensure is, by its nature, a 
process that establishes the conditions for entry into an occupation.”). 
54. This is true in other industries, as well. For example, motor vehicle transportation is often 
regulated through local codes that separately address “taxis,” “sedans,” and “limousines,” and these 
silos tend to be created in such a way as to maintain the perception of distinctiveness of the three 
despite the obvious potential for competitive overlap. See, e.g., FTC Letter to Brendan Reilly, supra 
note 49; see also Modernizing Regulation in the Canadian Taxi Industry, COMPETITION BUREAU 
CAN., http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04007.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9ZRZ-VVUA] (last updated Nov. 26, 2015). 
55. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: 
WINE (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-
report-concerning-possible-anticompetitive-barriers-e-commerce-wine/winereport2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5MKX-SDBQ] (discussing long-standing state regulatory impediments to the 
interstate sale of wines directly by producers to consumers). Another example is the case of 
electrical power distribution regulations that reflect the technologies and past integration of 
generation and distribution. See supra note 46. Yet another is the regulation of motor vehicle 
transportation services. As is true of health care professions, many local jurisdictions have long 
divided these services into seemingly distinct silos, treating “taxi,” “sedan” or “black car,” and 
“limousine” services as distinct, in effect limiting the degree to which they might compete. The 
competitive constraints of this approach have been exposed by the advent of smartphone-based 
applications that provide for a variety of services. See supra note 54. 
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unconsciously reflect the social mores of their times, including implicit 
assumptions about the likely gender and race of various service 
providers and the role they should play in the delivery of services. In this 
way, regulation can create, promote, and reinforce a sense of normalcy 
around a particular hierarchy of professionals.
56
 Such a hierarchy, 
especially once codified by laws and regulations, can itself be difficult to 
dislodge, even when it no longer appears justified or well-adapted to 
changed circumstances and times. In many ways, therefore, legacy 
regulations capture but a snapshot of the way things worked at the time 
of their origin; unless and until the regulations are challenged, they can 
perpetuate an approach that has become dated. 
From a competition policy perspective, legacy regulations can be 
profoundly stifling for innovation and they can slow the pace of change. 
They tend to entrench a specific business model and can forestall the 
development of new business models, even when not designed to do so 
intentionally. The consequence, however, is the same as if the 
regulations had been adopted to exclude alternatives: the entire 
regulatory scheme develops around a specific perception of how 
products should be produced or services should be provided, and it 
embeds that model as the only approach that can satisfy the regulations’ 
requirements.
57
 
3. Market Conditions Are Changing 
In the well-established literature on cartel formation, cartel-like 
stability is largely dependent on the ability of cartel members to control 
for changing market conditions.
58
 In many product and service markets, 
                                                     
56. While the sociology of gender-based stereotypes is beyond the scope of this Article, it is 
worth noting that the existing hierarchy of health care professionals likely is tied to historical gender 
roles, whereby most physicians were male and most nurses were female. Even today, gender biases 
persist: according to one respected source, over eighty percent of professional active nurses in the 
United States are female. Total Number of Professionally Active Nurses, by Gender, HENRY J. 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-number-of-professionally-active-
nurses-by-gender/#table [https://perma.cc/3WYQ-BL54] (last visited Feb. 5, 2016); see also U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, MEN IN NURSING OCCUPATIONS: AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY HIGHLIGHT 
REPORT 2 (2013), http://www.census.gov/people/io/files/Men_in_Nursing_Occupations.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6PCX-WMA5] (reporting that as of 2011, approximately ninety-one percent of 
employed nurses in the United States were female). See generally Ann V. Bell et al., The (Stalled) 
Progress of Interprofessional Collaboration: The Role of Gender, 28 J. INTERPROFESSIONAL CARE 
98 (2014) (arguing that interprofessional collaboration in furtherance of team-oriented health care 
delivery is hindered by gender-based occupational status hierarchy, combined with persistent 
underrepresentation of women in the physician workforce). 
57. For further discussion of the challenge of adapting such legacy regulatory systems to 
industries facing disruptive technologies, see Gavil, supra note 7, at 1911–17.  
58. See generally ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS 
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these conditions include significant fluctuations in market demand, as 
well as entry by new firms or the expansion of output by existing ones, 
which can be facilitated by new technologies.
59
 Commentators have 
explained, therefore, that exclusion can be and often is an essential 
feature of successful cartelization: to achieve stability, a cartel must be 
able to control for and respond effectively to new competitive challenges 
that might destabilize the cartel and trigger outbreaks of competition.
60
 
Faced with new competition, incumbents have two obvious choices: 
embrace or exclude. Incumbents can invite the new rival to join the 
cartel, or impede it from entering the market.
61
 
Exclusionary regulation can substitute for this kind of exclusionary 
conduct in heavily regulated industries. Long-term and pervasive 
regulation can create cartel-like conditions—stability in price, 
innovation, and other dimensions of competition, including the 
persistence of the dominant business model itself—even when there is a 
substantial number of suppliers.
62
 As noted above, regulation 
particularly affects conditions of new entry or expansion. New business 
models can present competitive challenges to such a staid and stable 
industry and, therefore, may tend to disrupt cartel conditions. 
Technology or other factors, such as increased demand, also can play a 
role, sometimes prompting or facilitating the development and 
emergence of new products, services, and business models that 
challenge the existing order. When “the new,” whatever it may be, does 
not align closely with the existing business model, its emergence 
generates friction with incumbent service providers, who may seek the 
                                                     
AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 235–47 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing economic analysis of 
cartel formation). 
59. Id. 
60. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 
527, 558 (2013) (“Colluding firms may need to exclude in order for their collusive arrangement to 
succeed. They may find it necessary to deter a cheating member through exclusionary conduct, or to 
exclude fringe rivals or new entrants in order to prevent new competition from undermining their 
collusive arrangement.” (footnotes omitted)); see also GAVIL ET AL., supra note 58, at 235–36. 
61. An illustration of this phenomenon is JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 
775 (7th Cir. 1999), in which a cartel of road pavers allegedly recruited and compensated asphalt 
producers to refuse to deal with a new, lower-priced road-paving entrant. See also infra notes 99–
100 (citing additional cases and examples). 
62. The regulation of motor vehicle transportation services is a prime example. For one recent 
account of the efforts of the incumbent taxi industry in New York City to use decades-old 
regulations to impede the entry and expansion of software application-based transportation services 
such as Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar, see Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Is on a Collision Course with New 
York City’s Mayor Again, VERGE (Dec. 4, 2015, 3:51 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/ 
12/4/9851000/uber-nyc-bill-de-blasio-report-investigation-cap-tax-cuomo [https://perma.cc/8FEW-
YRFP]. For a description of the economic consequences of limiting entry into the industry, see 
CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 51, at 717–18. See also supra note 54. 
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support of regulators, especially if they perceive “the new” to be a 
significant competitive threat.
63
 
Even when the competitive threat is not direct, the weight of legacy 
regulation can be sufficient to suppress a new business model. Inertia 
alone will tend to favor the incumbent. The crucial question then 
becomes whether the new model fits within, lies wholly outside, or 
simply cannot be squared with the existing regulations. 
4. New Services, Products, or Business Models Are Incompatible 
with Legacy Regulations 
Regulatory incompatibility is often a path to exclusion. It can be 
apparent when a new business model obviously falls within the scope of 
existing regulations, but does not share all of its characteristics. In that 
case, it will often be argued that the new model is not in compliance 
with accepted regulatory norms. In other cases, the new business model 
may fall within, but challenge the rationale for, existing regulations, 
revealing a need for adaptation and evolution in the regulatory scheme.
64
 
Incompatibility also can be “manufactured” if the new model seems to 
fall outside of the current scheme, prompting calls for the extension of 
regulations to bring it within the fold.
65
 Changing circumstances thus 
                                                     
63. Many of the kinds of regulations that fit this exclusionary profile are also local or regional, 
the product of a long-standing allocation of regulatory authority among federal, state, and local 
governing authorities. In some cases, incompatibilities develop when new national or even 
international business models emerge that inherently challenge the notion of local regulation. This 
type of challenge may be the case in the emerging practice of telehealth. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gilman, 
Physician Licensure and Telemedicine: Some Competitive Issues Raised by the Prospect of 
Practicing Globally While Regulating Locally, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 87, 89 (2011) 
(noting that the burgeoning field of telemedicine “promises in various ways to reduce the costs and 
extend the reach of many health care services,” but observing that “the advantages of remote and 
networked expertise may be poorly accommodated by licensing schemes that were developed to 
regulate local medical practices—practices historically dominated by face-to-face encounters 
between a physician and her patient” (footnotes omitted)). Localized regulations alone can also raise 
the cost of entry, as challengers seek to analyze and comply with myriad regulations across 
jurisdictions. 
64. For example, in 2008 the North Carolina State Bar sued LegalZoom, arguing that the 
company participated in the unlicensed practice of law when it provided a variety of prepaid legal 
services, including legal document templates. LegalZoom responded with an antitrust suit directed 
at the Bar and accusing it of using its authority to impede new forms of competition. The Bar and 
LegalZoom reached a settlement in 2015 that includes a promise by the Bar to support revisions to 
its definition of the practice of law. See Terry Carter, LegalZoom Resolves $10.5M Antitrust Suit 
Against North Carolina State Bar, ABA J. (Oct. 23, 2015, 3:15 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_resolves_10.5m_antitrust_suit_against_north_c
arolina_state_bar [https://perma.cc/55KG-4U56]. 
65. For a possible example, see Teladoc, Inc. v. Texas Medical Board, No. 1–15–CV–343 RP, 
2015 WL 4103658 (W.D. Tex. May 29, 2015), granting a motion preliminarily enjoining a new 
provision that required face-to-face physical examination of patients by a physician prior to 
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may highlight not only exclusionary aspects of existing regulations, but 
also prompt efforts to create or fortify incompatibilities. In either event, 
incompatibility is the lever most typically used to impede new rivalry. 
Rivals may advocate for change; incumbents for the status quo. 
Incompatibility is a matter of degree. The regulator has several 
options available for responding to regulatory incompatibility. Some 
approaches inevitably amplify the incompatibility in ways that are more 
likely to impede competition. Others may allow for, or even facilitate, 
evolution and innovation in the marketplace, leading to a new order that 
may be more conducive to evolution and more responsive to consumer 
demands. 
5. Incentives for Incumbent Firms to Seek Protectionist Regulation 
When these four factors are present, incumbent service providers may 
well have the incentive to seek regulatory protection as an alternative to 
launching a market-based competitive response to new sources of 
competition. Operating as if they were a covert cartel—but with the 
“cover” of the public regulatory process—incumbents may seek to 
address the changed market conditions and consequent competitive 
challenge through exclusionary regulation. If successful, they may be 
able to entirely bar the new professional or business model, slow its 
impact on incumbent operations, or perhaps just erect impediments to its 
acceptance. In short, incumbent firms may have the incentive to use 
legislators, regulators, and regulations to obtain protections they cannot 
lawfully secure for themselves.
66
 The negative consequences can be 
substantial and durable. Consumers may face higher prices, lower 
quality, reduced access, and a loss of innovation.
67
 
                                                     
prescribing any dangerous drug or controlled substance, effectively barring some of the telephonic 
health care services offered by the plaintiff. Another example is the effort by automobile dealers and 
their associations in a number of states to oppose efforts by electric vehicle manufacturer Tesla to 
sell its vehicles directly to consumers. See supra note 47. 
66. For other examinations of the challenges, viewed through the lens of the FTC’s competition 
advocacy program, see James C. Cooper et al., Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the 
FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005), and Tara Isa Koslov, Competition Advocacy at the Federal 
Trade Commission: Recent Developments Build on Past Successes, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Aug. 
2012, at 1, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6732 [https://perma.cc/HS9C-
LQVK]. 
67. For example, for a discussion of how this is unfolding in the electric power industry, see John 
Seesel & Jim Mongoven, Competition Sparks Improvements in Local Electricity Markets, FED. 
TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 1, 2015, 12:59 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/ 
competition-matters/2015/12/competition-sparks-improvements-local-electricity 
[https://perma.cc/64M8-GLPF]. 
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Our discussion of the five characteristics of markets conducive to 
exclusionary regulation is not hypothetical: these five characteristics are 
evident in the examples already discussed and are ubiquitous in today’s 
regulated health care professional markets. In Part II, we discuss a 
number of examples that illustrate how incumbents have sought to use 
regulation to insulate themselves from competition, by reducing 
competition among existing health care providers and impeding entry or 
encroachment by new types of providers. So long as reform eludes the 
decades-old legacy framework, health care professionals will have the 
incentive to use regulations in this way to stifle competition. 
II. REGULATORY MECHANISMS FOR CONSTRAINING 
SERVICE OVERLAP COMPETITION 
When faced with new competition, incumbents in heavily regulated 
industries have frequently urged regulators to react with hostility or at 
least extreme caution.
68
 As we have noted, such anticompetitive 
regulatory responses can take the form of either interpretations of 
existing regulations or the promotion and adoption of new ones more 
specifically targeted at limiting new competition.
69
 The effects can range 
from total exclusion of the new competition, to requirements that force it 
to adapt to existing regulatory models in ways that can deprive it of its 
competitive advantage, to the imposition of new requirements that can 
create or amplify incompatibility with the regulatory scheme. In this 
Part, we examine some specific examples of such regulatory responses 
and the economic impact they can have on new entry or the expansion of 
the provision of health care services. 
Health care markets, however, should not be treated as unique so that 
they become disconnected from the broader principles that guide 
antitrust enforcement and competition policy more generally.
70
 To 
                                                     
68. For discussion of contemporary examples drawn from a variety of industries, see supra 
Section I.D. 
69. Supra Section I.D. 
70. See, for example, Edith Ramirez, Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care—Controlling Costs, 
Improving Quality, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2245 (2014), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/ 
10.1056/NEJMp1408009 [https://perma.cc/V6LJ-UYZN]: 
The FTC supports the key aims of health care reform, and we recognize that collaborative and 
innovative arrangements among providers can reduce costs, improve quality, and benefit 
consumers. But these goals are best achieved when there is healthy competition in provider 
markets fostering the sort of dynamic, high-quality, and innovative health care that 
practitioners seek and patients deserve. 
Id. at 2247; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A 
DOSE OF COMPETITION 4 (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ 
improving-health-care-dose-competition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-department-
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anchor the analysis of anticompetitive regulation as it affects 
competition in the delivery of health care services, the discussion first 
locates it within the broader context of competition policy. The analysis 
of exclusionary regulations can be informed by reference to three well-
established areas of antitrust law enforcement: exclusion, the 
suppression of innovation, and coordination by trade groups. As we shall 
demonstrate, all three areas share characteristics in common with efforts 
to use regulation to eliminate or dampen competition from new business 
models and expanded services in the health care industry. Although the 
means of exclusion can vary, the economic mechanisms are the same 
whether they are a product of private conduct or regulation.
71
 This well-
developed framework for assessing anticompetitive conduct, therefore, 
can help to identify, analyze, and examine specific instances of 
potentially exclusionary regulation. 
A. Analogizing Regulatory Exclusion to Coordinated Exclusionary 
Conduct 
The common concern of almost all antitrust and competition law is 
the prevention of conduct that has the actual or probable effect of 
creating, maintaining, or protecting from erosion, market power.
72
 
Anticompetitive collusion can do so by directly reducing competition 
between rival firms that coordinate their activity, whereas 
anticompetitive exclusion does so indirectly by obstructing the ability of 
rival firms to compete in such a way as to facilitate the exercise of 
                                                     
justice/040723healthcarerpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLU7-NZ2G] (discussing benefits of competition 
in health care markets). 
71. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ 
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 230 n.73 (1986) (collecting authorities and 
noting that the article’s economic analysis of raising rivals’ costs “represents a synthesis of a large 
number of economics articles on the subjects of cost-raising and rent-seeking strategies generally, as 
well as several articles on vertical integration, vertical foreclosure, exclusive dealing, and special 
interest regulation” (emphasis added)); see also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 51, at 372 (“A 
firm may raise its rivals’ costs through government regulation.”). 
72. The Supreme Court has defined “market power” for antitrust law purposes as “the ability to 
raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market.” NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 
468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984); see also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 51, at 642 (“A firm (or 
group of firms acting together) has market power if it is profitably able to charge a price above that 
which would prevail under competition, which is usually taken to be marginal cost.”). The Supreme 
Court has acknowledged, however, that price is just one dimension of competition. See Nat’l Soc. of 
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (“The assumption that competition is the 
best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain—
quality, service, safety, and durability—and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by 
the free opportunity to select among alternative offers.”). 
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market power.
73
 Although collusion has been described as the “supreme 
evil” of antitrust,74 as Professor Jonathan Baker has persuasively argued, 
“anticompetitive exclusion, like anticompetitive collusion, must be 
understood as a core concern of competition policy.”75 Other 
commentators have similarly argued that exclusionary strategies that are 
likely to harm competition and unlikely to present any procompetitive 
benefits ought to “be at the core of an enforcement agenda that 
challenges exclusionary conduct.”76 As Baker points out, however, 
collusion and exclusion often go hand-in-hand.
77
 Many of the most well-
known and successful antitrust cases have involved allegations of 
exclusion,
78
 and many of the formative Supreme Court cases that are 
often thought of as involving collusion also have involved exclusion.
79
 
Indeed, Baker argues that successful exclusion may be a prerequisite for 
successful collusion.
80
 That is often the case with efforts by incumbent 
firms to use regulation to insulate themselves from competition by 
excluding rival service providers, but exclusion can benefit incumbent 
firms even when they are not colluding and even when they individually 
lack market power. 
                                                     
73. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp offer this general definition of “anticompetitive 
exclusion”: 
[A]cts that. . . 
(1) are reasonably capable of creating enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by impairing 
the opportunities of rivals; and 
(2) either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are unnecessary for the particular 
consumer benefits claimed for them, or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to any resulting 
benefits.  
3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 651a, at 98 (4th ed. 2015). 
74. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). 
75. Baker, supra note 60, at 532. For an explanation of the economic relationship between 
collusion and exclusion, see id. at 556–58. 
76. Susan A. Creighton et al., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975, 978 (2005). 
77. Baker, supra note 60, at 536 (“Exclusionary conduct allegations are also central to other 
antitrust decisions commonly thought of as alleging collusion.”). 
78. Id. at 535–36. 
79. Id. at 535–37. 
80. Id. Baker cites as examples California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) 
(broad prohibitions on professional advertising were enforced through threats of sanctions and 
expulsion), National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1986) (ban 
on competitive bidding was implemented through a Code of Ethics and those members who violated 
the ban could be threatened with disciplinary action), and NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 
(1984) (NCAA member schools who deviate from the association’s agreement to restrict the output 
of televised college football games faced expulsion from the NCAA). This has also been true of 
some important cases initiated by the government enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Realcomp II, 
Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011) (association of real estate brokers violated the antitrust 
laws when its members adopted anticompetitive website policies that prohibited nontraditional 
listings from being included in the association’s multiple listing service for residential real estate). 
09 - Gavil Koslov.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/27/2016  3:15 PM 
2016] PROMOTING HEALTH CARE COMPETITION 177 
 
1.  The Law and Economics of Exclusion as Foundation 
The most typical forms of exclusion involve conduct that impedes a 
rival’s access either to inputs (sometimes called “input foreclosure”) or 
to distribution or customers (sometimes called “customer foreclosure”). 
In either event, the focus of the inquiry is on whether the challenged 
conduct raises the costs for some competitors, reduces their output 
capacity or raises their costs of expansion, or reduces their revenues in 
such a way as to eliminate them or make them less effective 
competitors.
81
 This raising rivals’ costs (RRC) theory of exclusion 
generally describes conduct to raise the costs of competitors with the 
purpose and effect of causing them to raise their prices or reduce their 
output or fail to expand, thereby allowing the excluding firm or group of 
firms to profit by setting a supracompetitive price.
82
 Total exclusion 
from the market is not required to secure this kind of anticompetitive 
advantage.
83
 
RRC theory has been influential in a number of the most prominent 
modern cases involving allegations of exclusionary conduct.
84
 For 
example, it was an important component of the Justice Department’s 
1998 case against Microsoft,
85
 and more recently was invoked by the 
Eleventh Circuit in a case involving exclusive dealing that was brought 
by the Federal Trade Commission.
86
 Both of these cases involved 
                                                     
81. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 71, at 213–14 (“[C]laims of anticompetitive exclusion 
should be judged according to whether the challenged practice places rival competitors at a cost 
disadvantage sufficient to allow the defendant firm to exercise monopoly power by raising its 
price.”). 
82. See Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-
Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 315 (2006). The economic theory underlying the theory 
of raising rivals’ costs was developed in Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ 
Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983); see also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 51, at 371–79. 
83. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, ¶ 651b5, at 110, 111 (“RRC theories show 
that certain practices that have traditionally been subject to antitrust scrutiny can be anticompetitive 
even though they do not literally involve the destruction of rivals . . . . [T]he law has never required 
complete market exclusion as a prerequisite to suit.”). 
84. For a more complete discussion, see GAVIL ET AL., supra note 58, at 592–98. 
85. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[A]lthough Microsoft 
did not bar its rivals from all means of distribution, it did bar them from the cost-efficient ones.”). 
For an explication of the theory of the government’s case in Microsoft, see ANDREW I. GAVIL & 
HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST CASES: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 61–66 (2014). 
86. See McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 832 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[A]n exclusive dealing 
arrangement can be harmful when it allows a monopolist to maintain its monopoly power by raising 
its rivals’ costs sufficiently to prevent them from growing into effective competitors.”). For an 
analysis of the exclusionary effects at issue in the FTC’s McWane decision, see Steven C. Salop et 
al., The Appropriate Legal Standard and Sufficient Economic Evidence for Exclusive Dealing 
Under Section 2: The FTC’s McWane Case (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Working Paper No. 1365, 
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successful challenges to conduct that sought to deprive rivals of cost-
effective access to distribution and thus are analogous to regulations that 
interfere with a service provider’s ability to reach customers—or, as 
Section II.B discusses, in the health care industry, patients. 
As the United States v. Microsoft
87
 court recognized, “the means of 
illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad.”88 
Various commentators have noted this range of conduct and offered 
alternative ways to synthesize the cases into identifiable patterns.
89
 
Regardless of their form, however, anticompetitive strategies utilize a 
common economic mechanism: by raising rival’s costs, they can in some 
circumstances facilitate the exercise of market power or otherwise 
insulate a dominant firm or group of incumbent firms from competition. 
As Professors Hemphill and Wu have explained: 
When harmful, these [exclusionary] methods may weaken the 
rival, for example, by preventing it from achieving the 
economies of scale required to offer a competitive price. Lack of 
scale may also preclude a rival from gaining enough consumer 
adoption for a virtuous cycle to kick in, whereby widespread 
adoption makes the product more attractive for all users. The 
weakened competitor might also find it difficult to finance, 
either from external capital markets or retained earnings, the 
research and development needed to better displace the 
incumbent in the future. In the limit, these tactics may prevent 
entry entirely.
90
 
Exclusionary regulation fits comfortably within this conceptual 
framework. In almost all of its forms, the probability that it will harm 
competition depends in the first instance on its tendency to successfully 
impede a rival firm’s or a class of rival firms’ access to inputs or 
customers by imposing additional costs on, or erecting other barriers to, 
                                                     
2014), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1365/.http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/ 
facpub/1365/ [https://perma.cc/PC39-4CNF]; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, 
¶ 651b5, at 110 n.36 (collecting cases that have acknowledged the raising rival’s costs theory). 
87. 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
88. Id. at 58; see also C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 
1200 (2013) (“Anticompetitive exclusion can occur by a wide variety of means.”). 
89. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 60, at 538–43 (identifying three types of practices that courts have 
identified as potentially exclusionary: constraints imposed on rival conduct, the purchase of 
exclusionary rights, and commitments to tough competition); see also Hemphill & Wu, supra note 
88, at 1200–09 (classifying conduct that unreasonably forecloses competition into six categories that 
have been recognized in the case law: simple exclusion, recruiting agents, overbuying an input, 
tying and bundling, resale price maintenance, and most favored nation provisions). 
90. Hemphill & Wu, supra note 88, at 1200. 
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entry.
91
 In doing so, such regulations can help perpetuate the market 
power of incumbent firms or the collective market power of groups of 
small firms and otherwise insulate them from all dimensions of 
competition, not only price, but also quality and innovation. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, as illustrated in Section I.D, such restrictive 
regulations are often advocated by incumbent firms either in parallel or 
through explicit coordination.
92
 And whether accomplished through 
private conduct or regulation, RRC can impede innovation in the 
marketplace, especially when it is targeted at the new business models or 
service delivery methods used by service providers. 
Before turning back to an examination of specific examples from the 
health care services field, however, it is valuable to consider how RRC 
relates to two additional areas of antitrust law enforcement: (1) the 
suppression of innovation, and (2) trade association activity. An 
examination of these cases lends further context to the analysis of 
exclusionary regulations and completes the framework for identifying 
and analyzing anticompetitive instances of regulation. 
2. Protecting Innovation and Innovation Competition 
The protection of competition sparked by innovation has long been a 
concern of antitrust law.
93
 That concern has been evident in cases 
involving both collusion and exclusion to suppress innovation.
94
 It has 
taken on even greater importance in today’s technology-driven and 
dynamic economy, where new products and new business methods can 
pose substantial competitive challenges to status quo firms. As we 
observed in Section I.D, the competitive threat of such changes in the 
marketplace can lead incumbent firms to respond with exclusionary 
strategies.
95
 Indeed, one of the paradigmatic early cases on exclusion 
                                                     
91. See, e.g., FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 33 (“To the extent that rigid APRN 
supervision requirements may inhibit the growth of APRN-staffed retail clinics or prevent 
alternative settings from operating at all, such restrictions may deny consumers important price and 
non-price benefits of innovation in health care delivery.”). 
92. Collective efforts to petition or lobby the government for such anticompetitive regulations 
may be beyond the reach of antitrust enforcement. For a discussion, see Gavil, supra note 7, at 
1916–17. 
93. See generally GAVIL ET AL., supra note 58, at 1162–72 (discussing various ways in which 
antitrust law has sought to deter conduct that suppresses innovation); see also Timothy Wu, Taking 
Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement If Innovation Mattered Most, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 313 
(2012) (arguing for a broader commitment to using antitrust law to promote innovation). 
94. For recent discussions, see Baker, supra note 60, at 559–62; Hemphill & Wu, supra note 88, 
at 1210–13 (discussing what they describe as “anticompetitive parallel exclusion” and emphasizing 
the importance of its impact on innovation). 
95. As Professors Hemphill and Wu argue, “[w]here the innovative product is a serious 
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involved efforts by a dominant local newspaper to squelch the 
competitive threat of then new technology: over-the-air AM radio.
96
 
Similarly and more recently, in Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC
97
 the FTC 
successfully challenged coordinated efforts by a local board of realtors 
to suppress competition from new, internet-based and lower-cost sales 
models.
98
 Many other examples from the annals of antitrust history can 
be cited to illustrate how incumbent firms can pursue exclusionary 
strategies rather than competitive ones in response to new products, 
services, and business models that challenge the status quo.
99
 
3. Trade Associations as Facilitators 
Strategies to suppress innovation are often pursued by professionals 
in cooperation with other members of their trade, sometimes through 
private standard setting, trade association rules including codes of 
conduct, and government regulation.
100
 A number of such cases have 
arisen in the health care industry, often in connection with the activity of 
                                                     
existential threat to members of the oligopoly, the incentive to block or co-opt the entrant can 
(understandably) be strong.” Hemphill & Wu, supra note 88, at 1212. 
96. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (incumbent newspaper refused to 
accept advertisements from its customers who also placed advertisements with new radio station). 
For an analysis of Lorain Journal through the lens of modern exclusion theory, see GAVIL ET AL., 
supra note 58, at 596–98. 
97. 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011). 
98. Id. at 829–34 (finding substantial evidence that Realcomp’s “website policy,” which restricted 
consumer access to discounted online and limited service business models, was unreasonably 
anticompetitive). 
99. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500–01 (1988) 
(use of private industry standard-setting process to exclude new competitive threat); Am. Soc’y of 
Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (concluding that non-profit standard-setting 
group could be held liable under the antitrust laws for allowing its members to manipulate its 
standards to exclude their rival’s product); United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 241 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (finding no error in the district court’s finding “that product innovation and output has 
been stunted by the challenged policies”); United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (“[I]t would be inimical to the purpose of the Sherman Act to allow monopolists free reign to 
squash nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at will—particularly in industries marked by rapid 
technological advance and frequent paradigm shifts.”). For a discussion of the exclusionary theories 
in both Visa and Allied Tube, see Hemphill & Wu, supra note 88, at 1191–93. For an additional 
discussion of the exclusionary possibilities in the context of private standard-setting organizations, 
such as those involved in Allied Tube and American Society of Mechanical Engineers, see Creighton 
et al., supra note 76, at 987–88. 
100. See supra note 99; see also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 
U.S. 656 (1961) (holding that a gas burner manufacturer stated an antitrust claim for relief against 
trade association and its gas supplier members who refused to approve manufacturer’s burner for 
use by gas utilities); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (condemning 
boycott by designers and manufacturers of women’s garments directed at retailers who also resold 
allegedly “pirated” designs of lower cost rival manufacturers). 
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trade associations.
101
 Indeed, trade groups of various kinds have 
frequently been, and continue to be, a persistent focus of antitrust 
enforcement. The pervasiveness of such groups in the health care trades 
draws attention to the connection between the anticompetitive acts of 
trade groups and those of self-interested state boards charged with 
enforcing professional regulations, a connection that the Supreme Court 
recently acknowledged: 
In important regards, agencies controlled by market participants 
are more similar to private trade associations vested by States 
with regulatory authority than to the agencies [Town of Hallie v. 
City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985)] considered. And as the 
Court observed three years after Hallie, “[t]here is no doubt that 
the members of such associations often have economic 
incentives to restrain competition and that the product standards 
set by such associations have a serious potential for 
anticompetitive harm.
102
  
                                                     
101. One example is American Medical Ass’n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), which also 
illustrates the relationship between collusion and exclusion. The FTC prevailed in its challenge to 
certain AMA ethical rules that restrained advertising, including the dissemination of price 
information, and solicitation. Id. at 450. The FTC also successfully challenged the AMA’s 
prohibitions of various kinds of contractual arrangements between physicians and non-physicians, 
restrictions that limited the business models available to physicians. Id. at 451–52. The case can be 
understood, therefore, as an additional illustration of the interdependence of collusion and 
exclusion. See also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (holding that, although FTC’s 
use of abbreviated rule of reason analysis in connection with certain prohibitions on professional 
advertising was improper, the prohibitions were enforced by the association through threats of 
sanctions and expulsion of advertising members). For a more recent example, see Kissing Camels 
Surgery Center, LLC v. Centura Health Corp., 111 F. Supp. 3d 1180 (D. Colo. 2015), denying a 
motion to dismiss an antitrust claim that a trade association, hospitals with surgery centers, and 
insurers conspired to refuse to enter into necessary transfer agreements with non-hospital 
ambulatory surgical centers which had the effect of impeding their ability to compete. 
102. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exm’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015) (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. at 500) (rejecting application 
of state action doctrine to state board of dental examiners, which sought to eliminate competition 
from low-cost teeth whitening services provided by non-dentists); see also S.C. State Bd. of 
Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the board was not insulated from 
antitrust liability for its efforts to prevent dental hygienists from providing basic dental care services 
to underserved populations). Indeed, knowing that conduct by the trade group may violate the 
antitrust laws could provide the needed incentive for group members to instead turn to government 
regulation to achieve the same, prohibited ends without incurring the risk of personal liability. See 
also Memorandum from Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Guidance on Active Supervision of State 
Boards Controlled by Market Participants (Oct. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
attachments/competition-policy-guidance/active_supervision_of_state_boards.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5BWS-9T8L] (providing additional guidance for states on compliance with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners); Blair & Durrance, 
supra note 31, at 31–32 (modeling the harm to competition and consumers that can occur when 
licensure and related regulations are used by one group of health care providers to exclude a 
competing group of providers, with no offsetting quality of care benefits). 
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In assessing how regulation can be used to impede competition, 
therefore, it can be revealing to examine the economic underpinnings of 
antitrust law enforcement actions that have been directed at 
anticompetitive conduct by trade groups. That economic analysis is 
instructive whether those actions were adopted and implemented by self-
interested boards, as in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners 
v. FTC,
103
 or are the product of trade group conduct.
104
 Such cost-raising 
strategies are common in examples of regulations that impede 
competition. 
This Section provided an analytical framework that can be applied to 
specific recent examples of exclusionary regulation in the health care 
professions. To construct that framework, it drew upon three well-
established areas of antitrust: the law and economics of anticompetitive 
exclusion, suppression of innovation, and trade group and association 
activity that eliminated competition. In the illustrations that follow, 
exclusionary regulation often lies at the intersection of these three areas 
of antitrust. Virtually all of the examples that follow illustrate how 
industry incumbents in the health care industry, either in parallel or 
through coordination, have sought to use regulation to impede the access 
of their perceived rival service providers to patients and other purchasers 
of their services. In some instances, the rival providers were attempting 
to expand competitive overlap with incumbent service providers by 
advancing new and innovative service or business models. The 
successful exclusion of such new providers in turn can diminish the 
opportunity and incentives for future innovations in service delivery. 
Regardless of context, in each instance the conduct’s anticompetitive 
effect can be attributed to its tendency to alter the conditions of entry 
into the field by raising the costs, or reducing the revenues, of the 
targeted rival group, without substantial justification.
105
 With this 
foundation in place, the next Section turns to a sampling of recent 
illustrations. 
                                                     
103. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 135 S. Ct. 1101. 
104. See, e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207, 212–15 (7th Cir. 1984) (remanding an 
antitrust challenge by chiropractors against various medical trade groups alleging conduct that 
impaired their ability to compete with medical doctors). 
105. For a general discussion of the consequences of regulations that limit entry, see CARLTON & 
PERLOFF, supra note 51, at 716–18. 
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B. Anticompetitive Regulation in the Health Care Industry: A 
Sampling 
To make our analysis more concrete, we next identify specific 
examples of health care professional regulations that may impede 
competition. When evaluated in the context of the overlap areas in 
Figure 1 above, the exclusionary nature of these regulations becomes 
apparent: they make it impossible to fully realize the competitive 
benefits that arise when different types of health care providers can 
safely and effectively perform at least some of the same services. 
Further, the public safety arguments proffered to justify the specific 
restrictions at issue appeared to be either exaggerated or unsupported. 
All of these examples are drawn from advocacy comments filed by 
FTC staff in recent years. As an important component of the agency’s 
competition mission, upon request FTC staff regularly engages in 
competition advocacy by filing comments that analyze the competitive 
effects of proposed state legislation or regulations.
106
 From January 2010 
through November 2015, FTC staff sent more than fifteen advocacy 
comments to state legislators regarding scope-of-practice restrictions,
107
 
and also published a March 2014 staff policy paper, Policy Perspectives: 
Competition and the Regulation of Advanced Practice Nurses.
108
 
The FTC staff policy paper, drawing from and expanding upon prior 
FTC staff comments, focuses on various forms of mandatory physician 
supervision of APRNs.
109
 Slightly more than half the states currently 
                                                     
106. Advocacy Filings, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/ 
advocacy-filings [https://perma.cc/FLB5-ZKRN] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) (“When government 
bodies and other organizations consider cases or policy decisions that affect consumers or 
competition, the FTC may offer insight and expertise to decision makers by filing an advocacy 
letter.”); see also Gavil, supra note 7, at 1902–05 (discussing sources of FTC’s authority to engage 
in competition advocacy); Cooper et al., supra note 66, at 1092–99 (describing history of FTC 
advocacy comments from 1974–2004); Koslov, supra note 66, at 6–8 (describing examples of FTC 
competition advocacy comments involving intellectual property, innovation, and health care). 
107. To access FTC staff competition advocacy comments, see Advocacy Filings, supra note 106. 
108. FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36. Ms. Koslov was one of two principal authors of 
the policy paper (with Daniel J. Gilman), and Professor Gavil supervised the project as then-
Director of the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning. See also Daniel J. Gilman & Julie Fairman, 
Antitrust and the Future of Nursing: Federal Competition Policy and the Scope of Practice, 24 
HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 143, 171–206 (2014) (discussing and evaluating FTC staff competition 
advocacies affecting various health care professionals). 
109. Similar issues have arisen with supervision requirements imposed on dental hygienists. See, 
e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Valencia Seay, Senator, Ga. State Senate (Jan. 29, 
2016) [hereinafter FTC Letter to Valencia Seay], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-georgia-state-senator-valencia-seay-concerning-georgia-
house-bill-684/160201gadentaladvocacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y5P-J6ME] (supporting proposed 
legislation that would broaden settings where dental hygienists can provide preventive dental care 
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restrict otherwise qualified APRNs from practicing to the top of their 
license,
110
 unless they also satisfy an additional layer of physician 
supervision requirements that may include, for example, mandatory 
chart review, specified numbers or types of physician consultations, or 
physician approval of practice plans or protocols.
111
 They may also 
include mandatory “collaborative practice agreements,” whereby an 
APRN must secure (and often pay for) a written agreement with a 
physician, in which the physician specifies acceptable terms for the 
APRN’s practice.112 In many of these states, such supervision is a 
general prerequisite to licensed APRN practice; in some states, these or 
other restrictions pertain to large parts of practice, such as prescribing 
medications or diagnosing illnesses. The physician becomes a 
“gatekeeper” for the APRN’s entry and continued access to the 
profession—“effectively giv[ing] one group of health care professionals 
the ability to restrict access to the market by another, competing group 
of health care professionals, thereby denying health care consumers the 
benefits of greater competition.”113 
                                                     
services without direct in-person supervision by a dentist, which likely would enhance competition 
and expand access to care); Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Teneale E. Johnson, Exec. 
Sec’y, Bd. of Dental Exam’rs (Nov. 16, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-maine-board-dental-examiners-concerning-proposed-rules-
allow-independent-practice/111125mainedental.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VYX-6LMP] (concerning 
proposed rules to allow independent practice dental hygienists to take x-rays in underserved areas); 
Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Randall Vaughn, Sec’y of State, Ga. Bd. of Dentistry (Dec. 
30, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-
comment-georgia-board-dentistry-concerning-proposed-amendments-board-rule-150.5-0.3-
governing-supervision-dental-hygienists/101230gaboarddentistryletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC4E-
UYK7] (concerning proposed amendments to Board rule 150-5-.0.3 governing supervision of dental 
hygienists).  
110. See AANP State Practice Environment Data, supra note 35 (summarizing the APRN 
practice environment in each state, including comparative characterizations of “full,” “reduced,” or 
“restricted” practice). 
111. FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 28. For a general (albeit somewhat outdated) 
summary of state-by-state supervisory requirements, see IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra 
note 11, at 157–61, tbl.3-A1. See also GRANT R. MARTSOLF ET AL., THE IMPACT OF FULL PRACTICE 
AUTHORITY FOR NURSE PRACTITIONERS AND OTHER ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES IN 
OHIO (2015), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR848/ 
RAND_RR848.pdf [https://perma.cc/43G2-3SZP]. 
112. FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 28. Of the ten most populous states, six are 
listed in the “restricted” category (California, Texas, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and 
Michigan) and the other four are in the “reduced” category (New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and 
Ohio). AANP State Practice Environment Data, supra note 35; see Resident Population Data, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-dens-text.php 
[https://perma.cc/2X39-K5ZE] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
113. FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 2; see also FTC Letter to Valencia Seay, supra 
note 109, at 3 (“By increasing the availability of dental hygienists’ services outside of dentists’ 
offices, these initiatives can increase the number of suppliers of preventive dental care. The 
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A subset of related regulations restrict the ability of APRNs to write 
prescriptions independently—typically for controlled substances114 used 
for pain relief, but sometimes even for basic drugs like antibiotics. When 
these restrictions are in place, an APRN can only write prescriptions 
subject to a collaborative practice agreement or another form of 
physician supervision, such as the physician’s “delegation” to the APRN 
of prescribing authority.
115
 These regulations needlessly reserve for 
physicians the power to prescribe, even though credible evidence 
establishes that APRNs can safely and effectively prescribe a variety of 
medications, and no credible countervailing evidence negates this 
conclusion.
116
 Even with respect to more controversial pain medications, 
where scope of practice variations among states create a natural 
experiment, it appears that APRNs safely and effectively prescribe 
controlled substances in a number of states,
117
 which calls into question 
the legitimacy of other states’ restrictions. 
                                                     
initiatives thereby promote greater competition in the provision of oral health services. Greater 
competition may, in turn, enhance access to affordable preventive services, mitigate the broader 
health consequences of dentist shortages, and facilitate the development of innovative models for 
delivering care.”). 
114. “Drugs, substances, and certain chemicals used to make drugs are classified into five (5) 
distinct categories or schedules depending upon the drug’s acceptable medical use and the drug’s 
abuse or dependency potential.” Drug Scheduling, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., 
http://www.dea.gov/druginfo/ds.shtml [https://perma.cc/A3TA-S2RA] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); 
see also Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 
Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012)); 21 U.S.C. § 812 (“Schedules of 
controlled substances”). 
115. Many states restrict prescribing authority by requiring such authority to be explicitly 
included in a mandatory collaborative practice agreement, or by requiring an additional act of 
delegation that is specific to prescribing. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-33-34(4)(C)–(D) (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (imposing requirements for written protocols and physician 
supervision; mandating that prescribing authority for all drugs, including non-controlled substances, 
must be delegated pursuant to written protocol and is limited to an APRN’s defined specialty role); 
see also supra note 30 (comparing prescribing authority in Wyoming and Texas). For an overview 
of each state’s prescribing rules for APRNs, see Laura A. Stokowski, APRN Prescribing Law: A 
State-by-State Summary, MEDSCAPE NURSES (June 9, 2015), http://www.medscape.com/ 
viewarticle/440315 [https://perma.cc/8AMB-XAKY]. 
116. See, e.g., FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36; see also infra notes 141–43 and 
accompanying text (citing and interpreting various studies concluding that APRNs prescribe safely 
and effectively); Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Kent Leonhardt, Senator, Senate of W. 
Va. (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-
comment-senate-west-virginia-concerning-competitive-impact-wv-senate-bill-516-regulation/ 
160212westvirginia.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ9Q-76KD] (expressing concerns about, inter alia, 
proposed legislation that would require certain APRNs to secure a separate prescribing license to 
gain independent prescribing authority, and would place control of that new licensure scheme 
entirely under the authority of the state’s Board of Medicine or Board of Osteopathy). 
117. See, e.g., MARIA SCHIFF, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, THE ROLE OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS 
IN MEETING INCREASING DEMAND FOR PRIMARY CARE 12–13 (2012), http://www.nga.org/cms/ 
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Also relevant to pain medication, FTC staff has filed several 
comments relating to scope-of-practice restrictions on certified 
registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs), a type of advanced practice nurse 
with specialized training in anesthesia and pain management.
118
 These 
restrictions complicate the problem of ensuring adequate access to pain 
management, which is a significant public health challenge, particularly 
in rural and other underserved communities.
119
 Some states have adopted 
scope of practice laws that prohibit CRNAs from providing anesthesia 
and other inpatient pain management services (e.g., epidurals for labor 
and delivery) without in-person supervision by an anesthesiologist, thus 
undermining the ability of otherwise competent CRNAs to safely 
provide expanded access to care in areas with anesthesiologist 
shortages.
120
 In addition, a number of states limit the ability of CRNAs 
to independently provide post-operative or chronic pain management in 
outpatient settings, without direct physician supervision.
121
 Again, given 
the natural experiment of expanded CRNA practice in a number of states 
(including many where Medicare allows direct billing for CRNA-
provided services)
122
 with no evidence of differential safety concerns,
123
 
it becomes difficult to defend the more restrictive approach. 
                                                     
home/nga-center-for-best-practices/center-publications/page-health-publications/col2-content/main-
content-list/the-role-of-nurse-practitioners.html [https://perma.cc/L68J-GCJU] (identifying states in 
which APRNs may independently prescribe controlled substances). 
118. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff: Massachusetts Should Consider 
Removing Physician Supervision Requirements for Nurse Practitioners and Nurse Anesthetists (Jan. 
23, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/ftc-staff-massachusetts-should-
consider-removing-physician [https://perma.cc/S5R3-CYKX]; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
FTC Staff: Proposed Missouri Legislation May Reduce Patient Access to Pain Management 
Services and Increase Prices (Mar. 28, 2012) [hereinafter FTC Missouri Comment], 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/03/ftc-staff-proposed-missouri-legislation-
may-reduce-patient-access [https://perma.cc/Z6K6-477Y]. 
119. See FTC Missouri Comment, supra note 118 (noting that some rural hospitals are located in 
counties in which there are no licensed anesthesiologists). See generally INST. OF MED., supra note 
32, at 57 (providing recommendations to improve pain management practices in the United States, 
including a recognition that “state and federal policy makers, who must craft policies related 
to . . . regulation of clinicians’ scope of practice,” are among the sectors that should contribute to 
solving the public health challenge of pain management). 
120. See, e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Heather A. Steans, Senator, Ill. State 
Senate (Apr. 19, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-
staff-comment-honorable-heather.steans-illinois-state-senate-concerning-illinois-senate-bill-1662-
and-regulation-certified/130424illinois-sb1662.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM9R-ALJB]. 
121. Id. 
122. Although Medicare imposes a supervision requirement for CRNAs, since 2001 individual 
states have been permitted to “opt out” of the supervision requirement. Medicare and Medicaid 
Programs; Hospital Conditions of Participation: Anesthesia Services, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,762 (Nov. 13, 
2001) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 416.42(d) (2016)). Effective November 13, 2001, CMS established 
an exemption for Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists from the physician supervision 
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In recent years, FTC staff has expanded its scope of practice advocacy 
to address restrictions on an emerging profession: dental therapists, who, 
as discussed above,
124
 are trained to provide some dental services 
traditionally provided only by licensed dentists. FTC staff commented 
on a type of restriction that arose at an “upstream” level: accreditation 
standards for dental therapy education programs.
125
 When the 
Commission on Dental Accreditation (CODA) proposed draft 
accreditation standards, the proposed standards implicitly assumed that 
all dental therapy students would be trained to practice only under the 
direct supervision of dentists.
126
 This framework all but guaranteed that 
graduates of dental therapy programs would be deemed to lack the 
training necessary to practice safely without direct supervision, which 
inevitably would influence scope of practice laws and constrain the 
discretion of states as they created licensing regimes for this new 
profession. Mandatory supervision would thwart one of the main 
                                                     
requirement. “This exemption recognized a Governor’s written request to CMS attesting that he or 
she is aware of the State’s right to an exemption of the requirement and that is in the best interests 
of the State’s citizens to exercise this option.” Conditions for Coverage (CfCs) & Conditions of 
Participations (CoPs): Spotlight, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CFCsAndCoPs/Spotlight.html 
[https://perma.cc/LQS4-LDNE] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). In opt-out states, it is possible to bill 
Medicare directly for CRNA services, without requiring the signature of a supervising physician. At 
least seventeen states have opted out. Id. Governors often determine that expanded CRNA practice 
authority is particularly critical in rural areas where anesthesiologists are in short supply. Hospitals 
and other health care facilities otherwise might be unable to treat emergencies or schedule 
procedures requiring anesthesia, unless an anesthesiologist were physically present. See generally 
Fact Sheet Concerning State Opt-Outs and November 13, 2001 CMS Rule, AM. ASS’N NURSE 
ANESTHETISTS, http://www.aana.com/advocacy/stategovernmentaffairs/Pages/Fact-Sheet-
Concerning-State-Opt-Outs.aspx [https://perma.cc/8BCV-WXKR] (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
123. See, e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Kay Khan, Representative, Mass. House 
of Representatives 8 & nn.67–68 (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-massachusetts-house-representatives-regarding-
house-bill-6-h.2009-concerning-supervisory-requirements-nurse-practitioners-nurse-anesthetists/ 
140123massachusettnursesletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/2URB-4NXC] (citing various sources from 
safety literature relating to CRNA practice, none of which provide evidence of patient harm). 
124. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
125. FTC 2013 CODA Comment, supra note 41. FTC staff provided a follow-up comment a year 
later, commending CODA for its revisions and encouraging CODA to finalize and adopt 
accreditation standards without undue delay. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Urges 
Dental Accreditation Commission to Adopt Dental Therapy Accreditation Standards (Dec. 1, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/12/ftc-staff-urges-dental-accreditation-
commission-adopt-dental [https://perma.cc/QAE8-5BGD]. 
126. FTC 2013 CODA Comment, supra note 41, at 1–2 (noting proposed standards stated that 
“diagnosis and treatment planning are the responsibility of a supervising dentist,” which “may deter 
the development of dental education programs that would train dental therapists to provide such 
services under the level of supervision required by each state . . . even when states determine that 
patient safety may not require [on-site supervision by a dentist]”). 
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purposes of dental therapists: to expand access to dental care, especially 
for underserved populations.
127
 The FTC staff comment encouraged 
CODA to consider making the accreditation standards neutral with 
respect to the role of supervising dentists, and to develop accreditation 
standards that would train dental therapists to practice without an on-site 
supervising dentist, thus preserving individual states’ flexibility to 
address supervision issues in their licensure and scope of practice 
laws.
128
 In other words, the comment acknowledged the interest of 
regulators in addressing any genuine health and safety concerns, but 
encouraged them to do so without imposing unjustifiable barriers to 
entry and expansion of services. 
Finally, in 2014, FTC staff commented on proposed Texas regulations 
that likely would have preserved the long-standing status quo approach 
by stifling the development of new business models for delivering dental 
services.
129
 The proposed regulations would have prohibited dentists 
from entering into contracts with “unlicensed persons” for the provision 
of non-clinical services, such as administrative and business 
management functions.
130
 The proposed regulations also would have 
expanded the Board’s authority to take disciplinary actions against 
dentists that entered into such contracts.
131
 
Although the draft regulations did not explicitly mention it, the 
proposals appeared to have been targeted at dental service organizations 
(DSOs), and would have had the effect of discouraging dentists from 
                                                     
127. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 150A.105 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Spec. Sess.) 
(“Limited practice settings. A dental therapist licensed under this chapter is limited to primarily 
practicing in settings that serve low-income, uninsured, and underserved patients or in a dental 
health professional shortage area.”); FTC 2013 CODA Comment, supra note 41, at 5 & n.40 
(“Dental therapists are likely to be most effective in expanding access to care, especially to the 
underserved, when they are allowed under appropriate circumstances to evaluate a patient and 
develop a treatment plan under the supervision of a remotely-located dentist.”); Dental Crisis in 
America: The Need to Expand Access: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Primary Health & Aging 
of the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 112th Cong. 28 (2012) (statement of Christy 
Jo Fogarty, Registered Dental Hygienist, Master of Science, Oral Health Practitioner), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg89737/pdf/CHRG-112shrg89737.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E5C2-9BJ6] (if dental therapists must have a dentist on-site, they cannot “do much 
to improve access to care for vulnerable populations”). 
128. FTC 2013 CODA Comment, supra note 41, at 9. 
129. Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Simone Salloum, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Tex. 
State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs (Oct. 6, 2014) [hereinafter FTC TX DSO Comment], 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-texas-state-
board-dental-examiners/141006tsbdecomment1.pdf [https://perma.cc/38MH-D67D] (commenting 
on proposed law that would restrict ability of dentists to enter into agreements with non-dentists for 
the provision of administrative services). 
130. Id. at 1, 4. 
131. Id. 
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affiliating with them. The comment expressed the staff’s concern that 
such restrictions could be anticompetitive: 
Dentists generally have little training in administration, which 
means that carrying out administrative tasks can be time 
consuming. Relieving dentists of the need to perform 
administrative tasks could increase the amount of dentistry 
services dentists could provide, and lower the costs of providing 
dental services. In addition, DSOs may support entry into Texas, 
or prevent exit, by dentists who prefer to affiliate with a DSO. 
This new entry may lead to lower prices, expanded services, and 
improved access to dental services. Because the proposed rules 
may well deter licensed dentists from contracting with DSOs, 
the proposed rules appear likely to impede competition and 
deprive consumers of these potential benefits.
132
 
This small sampling of the FTC staff’s most recent competition 
advocacy work in the health care field continues long-standing efforts by 
the agency to, first, identify anticompetitive laws and regulations (both 
current and proposed) and, second, provide a framework that regulators 
and legislators can use to evaluate the potential for anticompetitive 
harm. As argued in Section II.A, all of the staff’s analysis consistently 
focuses on entry-related regulations that impose costs on potential rivals 
and ensure that, even if they do successfully enter the market, revenues 
generated by their services will be shared with incumbent providers. The 
incumbent providers are often observable behind the scenes in these 
regulatory proposals. The competitive threat is always the same: by 
impeding change, including the emergence of innovative new delivery 
models, the troublesome regulations would have the effect of 
perpetuating the status quo and stifling competition in the marketplace. 
III. LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE 
WORKFORCE REGULATION 
A. Guiding Principles for Regulators 
As illustrated in Part II, regulations can favor incumbents to the 
detriment of competition in a number of ways. Some have completely 
barred competition, as by imposing unjustifiable limits on the scope of 
practice. Others, either working within existing regulatory schemes or by 
amending and expanding them, can alter the economic incentives of new 
service providers in a way that dampens their incentives to compete or 
                                                     
132. Id. at 5 (footnote omitted). Efforts to restrict the ability of professionals to affiliate with non-
professionals was also an issue in the FTC’s 1980 case against the AMA. See supra note 101. 
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relegates them to being less aggressive and less effective competitors. 
Supervision requirements in both the medical and dental fields provide 
illustrations. Often, these regulations have the effect of depriving new 
rivals of the very competitive advantage that drives consumer interest in 
their products, services, or business models. 
Regulators and health care industry stakeholders should consider a 
different path: evolutionary adaptation guided by some of the lessons of 
competition law enforcement and policy. We offer three guiding 
principles: (1) understand and integrate competition concerns into the 
consideration of regulation; (2) appreciate the self-perpetuating 
tendencies of regulations shaped by the business models of their time; 
and (3) consider reforms that move regulation away from approaches 
that lock-in particular business models to more flexible and adaptable 
standards that can account for continued change now and in the future, 
for example, by being explicitly subject to periodic review or by being 
crafted to allow for evolution without periodic revision. 
As FTC staff has consistently asserted in its competition advocacies, 
regulators in the health care field should be attentive to the competition 
consequences of regulation and should integrate competition concerns 
into their analysis.
133
 In repeating this point here, however, we mean to 
drive it home more specifically. Sound competition policy does not 
preclude some degree of regulation. Once the need for at least some 
regulation is established, however—as is often the case in the health care 
field—the discussion becomes more particularized. The inquiry shifts 
from asking “whether to regulate” to asking whether some very specific 
provision of a regulation is likely to harm competition and how. One 
valuable lesson learned from over a century of antitrust law enforcement 
is that competition policymakers must be attentive both to the 
characteristics of the specific market and to the unique economic 
mechanisms of harm at issue. 
In the context of exclusionary regulation, regulators first must 
familiarize themselves with the basic characteristics of the marketplace. 
More particularly, as described in Section I.D, they must be well-aware 
of the circumstances that suggest a market is conducive to abuse of the 
regulatory process to protect incumbents, exclude new challengers, and 
sacrifice consumer interests. If the regulatory context suggests reasons to 
be wary, regulators ought to be especially attentive to the costs, 
justifications, and probable consequences of proposed conditions, 
especially if they are targeted at challengers and are being advocated by 
                                                     
133. FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 17–18 (describing competition analysis of 
regulations that restrict competition). 
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long-entrenched incumbents. A series of questions can guide the 
analysis. First, does the proposed regulation (or interpretation) bar entry 
entirely? Second, if not, will compliance with the regulation (or 
interpretation) impose significant costs on market participants? Third, if 
it will impose significant costs, are those costs to be borne by all 
participants, or are they likely to impact solely the competitive 
challenger? Consistent with the teachings of cases and commentary 
based on the theory of raising rivals’ costs, the final and critical question 
will be whether the impact on the challenger will help to facilitate the 
creation of, or perhaps perpetuate the exercise of, market power by 
incumbents. 
The answers to these questions may suggest that there is a potential 
for competitive harm, but they do not end the inquiry. Competition 
principles and economic analysis also can help to evaluate the 
justifications offered for specific kinds of regulations that may be 
exclusionary. FTC staff, for example, has highlighted circumstances 
where the health and safety of the public, which is frequently invoked to 
justify various types of health care workforce regulation, are exaggerated 
or pretextual.
134
 Similarly, they have consistently argued that, when 
some regulation is warranted, regulators ought to adopt the regulation 
that is best calibrated to serve a genuine and substantiated public 
concern, while minimizing any adverse impact on competition.
135
 These 
have become bedrock principles of the FTC’s competition advocacy 
program. 
Especially in markets like health care that are undergoing significant 
evolution, regulators must also consider the impact of specific 
regulations on incentives to innovate, both for incumbents and new 
entrants. Regulators ought to carefully scrutinize requests for such 
regulations in markets that have been stagnant from the point of view of 
innovation, when the challenger threatens to disrupt the status quo, as by 
introducing new services or service models. These circumstances are 
especially vulnerable to exclusionary regulations and their effects can 
stifle the emergence of new services and service models for years to 
come.
136
 Hence, it is also important to inquire whether there are less 
                                                     
134. See, e.g., FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 35–36. 
135. Id. at 17 (urging regulators to consider whether regulations that appear likely to have an 
adverse impact on competition “are narrowly tailored to address [well-founded consumer protection 
concerns] without undue harm to competition, or whether less restrictive alternatives are 
available”). 
136. For example, in the case of the emerging field of dental therapy, accreditation standards that 
anticipate on-site supervision by dentists could discourage the creation of education programs 
designed to produce independently practicing dental therapists. See supra notes 39–41, 124–28 and 
accompanying text. Similarly, if states continue to prohibit the sale of motor vehicles directly to 
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restrictive regulatory options that might secure the benefits, but with less 
adverse impact on incentives to innovate.
137
 Exclusionary regulations 
can function like a moat, strategically placed around incumbent 
competitors in a protective perimeter that insulates them from attack 
from new rivals. They can be the product of collusion and have the 
effect of exclusion. A more complete understanding of the conditions 
under which such regulations can be sought, and an appreciation for the 
consequences of their adoption, will be essential to the health care work 
force of the future. 
Finally, we note that antitrust enforcement agencies can serve a 
critical, dual function in supporting this first guiding principle, i.e., that 
competitive effects analysis should be an integral part of the policy 
calculus. First, when needed, the agencies can help to educate regulators 
and legislators by offering their competition expertise to assess the 
important characteristics of the industry and to identify and analyze 
potentially anticompetitive regulations. More specifically, they can flesh 
out the mechanism of exclusion, bringing to bear the kinds of principles 
and cases discussed above in Section II.A, to explain the particular ways 
in which regulation can hinder competition. In doing so, they can give 
voice to consumer interests that may otherwise go unheard or 
undervalued. Competition enforcement agencies, however, should 
neither be arrogant nor naïve. Local legislators and regulators may often 
fully appreciate the anticompetitive potential of regulations, but for 
political and other reasons nevertheless may be poised to adopt them in 
response to the urging of industry incumbents. In such circumstances, 
government advocacy can provide needed transparency and a useful 
“sunshine” function, helping to expose possible consumer harm and 
informing broader public debate. 
                                                     
consumers, existing manufacturers will be discouraged from competing based on innovative new 
methods of internet-based sales. New entrants also may be discouraged from attempting to enter the 
market based on methods of distribution that do not rely upon independent dealers. See FTC Letter 
to Darwin L. Boorher, supra note 47, at 7–8 (“A direct sales ban deters experimentation with new 
and different methods of sales by current auto manufacturers, and also by future entrants to the 
market.”). 
137. See, e.g., FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 19 (“Regulatory choices that affect 
APRN scope of practice may have a direct impact on health care prices, quality, and innovation, 
often without countervailing benefits.”); id. at 38 (“APRN licensure and scope of practice 
restrictions, like other professional regulations, may advance important consumer interests. But 
when these restrictions restrain competition and are not closely tied to legitimate policy goals, they 
may do more harm than good.”); see also FTC TX DSO Comment, supra note 129, at 6–7 (“To the 
extent possible, restrictions should be narrowly tailored to minimize their potential anticompetitive 
effects, and to avoid unduly discouraging innovative and efficient models of practice that could 
compete against traditional providers without compromising safety or quality.”). 
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In the next and concluding Part, we turn to proposals for reform. Not 
the kinds of reforms that have infected the regulatory process and 
threatened the capacity of the health care work force to adapt to 
changing times. Rather, Section III.B suggests alternative models of 
regulation that would be less prone to ensconcing the status quo of 
particular business and service models for the delivery of health care, 
and more likely to prove attractive to challengers promoting safe, but 
innovative health care delivery models now or in the future. 
B. Paths to Reform 
Implementation of the principles outlined in Section III.A should help 
to diminish the incidence of exclusionary regulations. Here we conclude 
by offering several broader, specific suggestions to reform the U.S. 
approach to professional regulation in the evolving health care 
marketplace. While all of these proposals may be theoretically appealing 
from a pure competition perspective, we recognize that some of these 
ideas are more provocative than others. We also acknowledge that, as a 
practical matter, some reforms are likely to be exceedingly difficult to 
implement given the highly politicized nature of state-based professional 
regulation and the complex interplay of various interest groups. 
The easiest place to start—and, indeed, one of the purposes of this 
Article—is to encourage greater recognition that competition between 
different types of health care professionals does, in fact, exist and is 
likely to become increasingly common in the future. Such competition is 
a good thing—likely to reduce costs, expand access, improve quality, 
and drive innovation—and the value of these benefits should not be 
diminished. Too often, productive discussions about health care provider 
competition are suppressed with vague and exaggerated protests of 
safety concerns, claims of inadequate training for some types of 
providers, or other pretextual arguments.
138
 Some health care 
                                                     
138. See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, PRIMARY CARE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: 
ENSURING A QUALITY, PHYSICIAN-LED TEAM FOR EVERY PATIENT (2012); see also id. at i–ii 
(“This effort to have nurses practice independent of physicians comes at the very same moment that 
medical practice itself is changing to an integrated, team-based approach that includes physicians 
and other health professionals. These two approaches take the country and our health care system in 
opposite and conflicting directions.”); cf. AANP Responds to the American Academy of Family 
Physicians Report, AM. ASS’N NURSE PRAC. (Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.aanp.org/component/ 
content/article/28-press-room/2012-press-releases/1082-aanp-responds-to-aafp-report 
[https://perma.cc/VWA5-3SH8] (“The American Academy of Nurse Practitioners strongly supports 
patient-centered and team-based care models. However, AANP believes that AAFP’s efforts to link 
these evolving models of care with the licensure of nurse practitioner (NP) practice are misdirected 
and out of step with today’s environment.”); FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 34–35 
(refuting argument that physician supervision of APRNs is necessary to promote team-based care; 
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professionals seem reluctant to acknowledge that they care about losing 
income due to price competition, or that they would rather not have to 
compete on dimensions of quality or convenience if a larger pool of 
providers were authorized to offer certain services. As explained above, 
however, the triple aim goals are far more likely to be achieved—and the 
interests of consumers satisfied—if the idea of competition is more fully 
embraced and fostered. 
A more ambitious, but still realistic, solution would involve 
heightened state-by-state legislative efforts to address fundamental 
conceptions (and misconceptions) about which types of providers can 
safely perform which categories of services. As FTC staff repeatedly has 
suggested,
139
 state legislators who are drafting or reviewing specific 
scope of practice bills should carefully scrutinize purported safety 
justifications based on available empirical data as well as actual 
experience (including, where possible, experience in other states with 
less restrictive environments). 
State legislators, along with the providers themselves, are not alone in 
needing to rethink too-rigid categorizations regarding who performs 
which services, and how well, and at what cost. In health care markets—
as in all markets—people do what they are paid to do, and seek to 
maximize financial rewards. Therefore, we must also consider the 
critical role of health care payers, which include private health insurance 
companies, the federal government, and state governments. Ideally, 
reimbursement policies at all levels, both public and private, would 
become more agnostic regarding who has performed a given service, or 
even affirmatively promote expanded provision of services by lower-
cost professionals, thus stimulating greater competition and creating 
                                                     
explaining how collaboration routinely occurs among all health care providers, including in states 
without mandatory physician supervision of APRNs). See generally IOM FUTURE OF NURSING 
REPORT, supra note 11, at 110–14 (reviewing examples of, and reasons for, physician resistance to 
expanded nursing scope of practice; noting investment of significant lobbying resources “on the part 
of organized medicine to oppose boundary expansion and to defeat proposed legislation in several 
states to expand scope of practice for allied health care providers, including nurses. . . . [W]ith the 
assistance of a special full-time legislative attorney hired for the purpose, [an alliance of medical 
organizations] spearheaded several projects designed to obstruct expansion of scopes of practice for 
nurses and others”). 
139. See, e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Jenny A. Horne, Representative, S.C. 
House of Representatives 5 (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-south-carolina-representative-jenny.horne-regarding-
house-bill-3508-3078-advanced-practice-registered-nurse-regulations/151103scaprn.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N6D5-YHTF] (“[The proposed bill] would maintain supervision requirements that 
many states have done without or eliminated, and would add a new layer of bureaucratic process to 
meeting those requirements. Accordingly, we encourage you to consider whether these requirements 
are necessary to assure patient safety in light of your own regulatory experience, the findings of the 
IOM and other expert bodies, and the experience of other states.”).  
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financial incentives to deploy the health care workforce more efficiently. 
The volume-to-value shift in payment models, as well as greater 
financial interdependence among all providers within a given health care 
system, likely will encourage this approach. But as long as most health 
care reimbursement follows a fee-for-service model, it will continue to 
matter greatly who performs a given service and at what billing rate, and 
reimbursement policy choices can act as powerful levers to change 
behavior. 
In the longer term, we urge states to consider whether licensure for 
APRNs and similar professionals should be less rigid, and more like 
licensure for physicians. To recall the example above, general practice 
physicians are entrusted to decide, among other things, which services 
they are qualified to provide according to the standard of care and which 
patients should be referred to specialists.
140
 Unless there is reason to 
believe that the ethical and other self-regulating incentives of APRNs 
differ from those of physicians, a similar approach could be taken. The 
empirical literature suggests that APRNs are highly competent at 
determining which patients they can treat safely and which patients 
should receive physician referrals.
141
 A more flexible approach to APRN 
licensure would make it easier for the profession to adapt to changes in 
the standard of care over time, and also would facilitate taking full 
advantage of an individual professional’s qualifications, without 
requiring constant legislative intervention. It might also become a model 
for reform in other, similar areas of service overlap. 
Our most provocative suggestion is to consider national licensure for 
health care professionals, to insulate the licensure process from state-
level politics and mitigate the effects of silo-based turf battles that must 
be fought jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction.
142
 For the most part, each type of 
                                                     
140. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text (explaining broad and undifferentiated 
practice authority for physicians under all states’ medical practice acts); supra note 32 and 
accompanying text (providing an example of a general practitioner determining her own 
competency to read an x-ray and make a diagnosis). 
141. See, e.g., NGA NP PAPER, supra note 16, at 7–8 (summarizing review of empirical literature 
regarding APRN safety, concluding that quality of care provided by APRNs is not a concern, and 
noting that “[m]ost studies showed that NP-provided care is comparable to physician-provided care 
on several process and outcome measures”). Inherent in these and related quality findings is an 
assumption that, when presented with issues beyond their skills or expertise, APRNs refer patients 
to physicians. 
142. In addition, a shift to national licensure would greatly enhance workforce mobility, because 
state-based licensure makes it far more difficult for professionals to move from one state to another. 
Many workers may choose their occupation with the understanding that it requires a State 
license, but life events can intervene to change their expectations about the need to make a 
cross-state move. For example, military spouses may have entered their field before marriage. 
Other events—like a local disaster or a health crisis for a parent—may mean that workers who 
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health care professional in this country is educated according to common 
curricular and training standards for that profession, and certified and 
licensed based on the results of a national examination.
143
 National 
licensure also would promote interstate mobility as professionals move 
around the country, which would help to ease provider shortages in 
certain geographic areas. We recognize, however, that states rely on 
licensure fees as a source of revenue, which likely would skew states’ 
financial incentives to cede their licensing authority, and Congress might 
be reluctant to preempt long-standing state authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The health care marketplace is changing, and health care 
professionals at all levels of the system are an integral part of that 
change. If the national goals of lower cost, higher quality, and increased 
                                                     
had never planned to move across State lines after receiving a license suddenly find themselves 
needing to do so. In such cases, the need to re-license is an important concern. If States don’t 
offer a temporary license to practice (while re-certifying), then the financial barriers of 
licensing are even more significant. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS & DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL 
LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 39 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ASJ-TMGP]; see also 
KLEINER, supra note 33 (analyzing influence of occupational licensing on geographic mobility); id. 
at 20–21 (suggesting greater state-to-state reciprocity to reduce barriers to migration). 
143. Using nursing as an example, all candidates for licensure as a registered nurse in the United 
States and Canada sit for the same examination, known as the National Council Licensure 
Examination (NCLEX-RN) and administered by the National Council of State Boards of Nursing. 
NCLEX and Other Exams, NAT’L COUNCIL ST. BOARDS NURSING, 
https://www.ncsbn.org/nclex.htm [https://perma.cc/DG57-GFF4] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). While 
each state’s board of nursing determines eligibility criteria to apply for RN licensure and sign up for 
the NCLEX, every RN student in the country is expected to take the same examination and uphold 
the same standards of care; therefore, nursing schools and nationally certified accreditation 
organizations focus on designing and approving curricula around common criteria for scope and 
quality. See, e.g., Accreditation and Schools of Nursing, NURSINGSCHOOL.ORG, 
http://nursingschool.org/education/choosing/accreditation/ [https://perma.cc/MMQ3-DY3S] (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2016). In addition, a number of state legislatures have considered or adopted bills 
that would implement aspects of the APRN Consensus Model, which has been designed to align 
requirements for licensure, accreditation, certification, and education for advanced practice nurses 
in all states, and thereby facilitate licensure portability across state lines. See APRN Consensus 
Model, AM. NURSES ASS’N, http://www.nursingworld.org/consensusmodel [https://perma.cc/ 
HUU8-JSS9] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); APRN CONSENSUS WORK GRP. & NAT’L COUNCIL OF 
STATE BDS. OF NURSING APRN ADVISORY COMM., CONSENSUS MODEL FOR APRN REGULATION: 
LICENSURE, ACCREDITATION, CERTIFICATION & EDUCATION (2008), https://www.ncsbn.org/ 
Consensus_Model_for_APRN_Regulation_July_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA6M-USDZ]; see also 
IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 11, at 23 (most RNs must pass standardized 
licensing exam); id. at 196–97 (describing typical graduate-level education and certification 
requirements for APRNs); Major Components of the Consensus Model by State, NAT’L COUNCIL 
ST. BOARDS NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org/2014.07_18_Julymapwithpoints.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ESP4-RF48] (last updated Dec. 2015). 
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access are to be achieved, the approach to regulating these varied 
professionals must also change, and competition principles must play an 
important role in any reformation. In the short term, responsible 
legislators and regulators should be informed of the competitive 
consequences of professional regulation. In particular, they should be 
wary of the self-interested claims of health care providers whose 
economic and professional sustainability are wedded to the status quo. 
Legislators and regulators also should carefully scrutinize 
unsubstantiated health and safety arguments that may mask 
anticompetitive motives. In the long-term, however, locally-sourced, 
silo-influenced, and highly specified regulations will need to give way to 
more flexible, more adaptable, and less easily manipulated performance 
and capability-based standards. Only then will we fully unleash the 
incentives most likely to facilitate the emergence of a health care 
services market tailored to the needs of the twenty-first century. 
 
